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Abstract
That God communicates with humanity through the Scriptures is the central
claim defended in the theology of Kevin J. Vanhoozer. This thesis investigates
the importance of the idea of triune communicative acts in Vanhoozer's
approach. His theology is shown to develop in response to several distinct
challenges: that of postmodernity, which is critical of the transmission of
meaning through texts; that of propositionalism, which dedramatizes the biblical
text; and that of demythologization, which holds God's being to be inaccessible
to humans. Vanhoozer is also shown to draw on a number of positive theoretical
sources, including speech-act theory, communicative action theory, and the
resources of Christian doctrine itself, which is notably redeployed through what
Vanhoozer terms "remythologization." The Conclusion offers a critical
evaluation of Vanhoozer's project, making use of the work of Mark McIntosh and
Nicholas Wolterstorff on the possibility of the communication of God without
direct reference to the Scriptures.

Keywords - meaning, communicative action, speech act, divine discourse,
Vanhoozer, propositionalism, drama, doctrine, remythologizing, spirituality,
Trinity.
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Introduction

In numerous discussions I have had with friends, colleges, and teachers, it
has become apparent to me that there are many, even within the Christian
Church, who question the claim that God is speaking to us through the
Scriptures. Historically the claim that God speaks through the Scriptures was not
controversial - through admittedly what God has spoken or is speaking was a
matter of considerable dispute. That God so speaks, however, was assumed to be
foundational in Christian faith. In modernity, however, this basic conviction
came to be challenged on a variety of grounds, mainly deriving from the
hegemony of modern reason as expressed particularly in the scientific outlook
and in historical scholarship. The result for theology and the church, however,
has been radically destabilizing, so that in late modernity, pluralism and ideals of
tolerance have tended to turn much of western Christianity into something of a
melting pot, while on the other side, reactionary fundamentalisms abound.
Against this background, I wish to defend in this thesis the "scandalous" claim
that Christian identity rests, not exclusively but nevertheless securely, on the idea
of a God who speaks, and who speaks through the Scriptures. Thus Christian
faith has its ground in a transcendent "O ther" who orders and controls the
biblical text in such a way that it can truly be called the Word of God.
Obviously, such a claim requires careful criticism, qualification and
elaboration, a contribution to which is the point of this thesis. Of course, not all
of the issues thus arising can hope to be examined within present constraints.
What follows therefore, can be defined more narrowly as an exploration of the
contribution made to understanding the substance of the claim that God thus

2

speaks found in the work of the contemporary American theologian Kevin J.
Vanhoozer. Vanhoozer's theology can be described most generally as an attempt
to tackle issues surrounding the biblical text as the actual speech of God, but in
numerous works over the last three decades written explicitly in the light of new
movements in philosophy, culture and theology that cohere loosely under the
title of post-modernity. Vanhoozer is a relatively unexamined theologian in
secondary theological scholarship, but an important voice in the study of
hermeneutics and theological method, especially in the evangelical circle that is
concerned with holding onto the Bible as God's Word.1 R. R. Reno has called
Kevin Vanhoozer, "perhaps the most interesting contemporary evangelical
theologian today,"2 while in 1999, Vanhoozer appeared on the cover of
Christianity Today as one of the six "new theologians" featured in the lead story.
Vanhoozer is an American theologian who did his doctoral work on Paul
Ricoeur at Cambridge University under Nicholas Lash.3 His first teaching
position was as a professor at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School in Deerfield,
Illinois, a school he would return to after eight years subsequently spent teaching
in Edinburgh. In 2009 he made the move from Trinity to Wheaton College,
where he is now serving as the Blanchard Chair of Theology. Vanhoozer is
"evangelical, orthodox, catholic" and has a desire to maintain a "Reformation
emphasis on the primacy of Scripture in a postmodern age that views questions
of meaning, knowledge, and truth largely in terms of human practices and

1 Everett Barry, "Speech Act Theory as a Corollary for Describing the Communicative Dynamics of
Biblical Revelation: Some Recommendations and Reservations," Criswell Theological Review 7, no. 1
(September 2009): 93.
2 R. R. Reno, "Schools of Thought: When Choosing a Graduate School the Brightest is not Always
the Best," First Things, November 2010, http://www.firstthings.com/article/2010/10/schools-of-thought
(accessed May 19, 2011).
3 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: A Study in Hermeneutics and
Theology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
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traditions of inquiry."4 He is a creative theologian and is well known for his
broad reading and research that cuts across theological, philosophical, critical
theory, communication studies and contemporary literary theory boundaries. He
is as capable of dealing with a French deconstructionist such as Derrida as he is
an older American evangelical scholar such as B.B. Warfield. For me this ability
to intelligently interact with subjects outside and inside theology is very
important and adds credibility to Vanhoozer's theories. This cross subject ability
is an important a part of Vanhoozer's theological interpretation of Scripture that
relates the many avenues of studying the Bible, such as systematic and biblical
studies to the broader theological task. Anthony Billington, in commenting on
Vanhoozer, reflects my sense of why I believe that Vanhoozer is such an
important voice in theology today, and why this thesis is warranted. Billington
writes:
One of the ongoing frustrations of undergraduate students studying
theology in some institutions is the way lecturers 'pass the buck' ('pass the
baton' might be a more sympathetic turn of phrase!) when it comes to
relating the various disciplines in the curriculum. So, when questioned
how some aspect of Old Testament theology relates to New Testament
concerns, students are sometimes told: 'That's the job of the New
Testament department....' The New Testament department, in their turn,
when questioned about the move from 'what it meant (then)' to 'what it
means (now)' invite students to ask the systematic theologians ('Haven't
you covered that in your Christology module?' or some such thing). By the
same token, lectures in doctrine or ethics or pastoral theology rarely touch
base with what goes on in Biblical studies modules.5
Vanhoozer is not willing that doctrine, Scripture, or ethics should be divided up.
In his work Vanhoozer displays a Christian self-confidence that places emphasis

4
Kevin J. Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical Linguistic Approach to Christian Theology
(Louisville: John Knox Press, 2005).
5Antony Billington, "Christian Cartography: Mapping Biblical Literature and Theology with Kevin
Vanhoozer," The Glass 13 (Winter 2000), http://www.clsg.org/html/rn.htm (accessed May 18, 2011).
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on the nexus points of where Scripture, doctrine, pastoral theology, worship, and
morality meet.
Vanhoozer is also a useful choice for a thesis because he delves into very
convoluted and multipronged areas of theology as one who mediates between
numerous of positions. Instead of discarding a position simply because it has
some elements that do not fit within a traditional theology, he attempts to work
them into one another. His taking a traditional stance does not mean that he
does so without a critique of traditional theology, however, especially of his own
experience of evangelical propositional theology. Vanhoozer says that his
approach is "post-propositional because it challenges previous ways evangelicals
have understood the nature of biblical statements." He makes the important
claim that, "The words and sentences of the canon do not always assert doctrinal
formulaic equations because biblical language and its related illocutions reside
within the broader literary genres and contexts experienced by the authors
throughout the history of redemption."6
This healing of the rupture between the many subjects important to
theology may not be going to happen in the near future, but I would suggest that
it is needed if theology is to be taken seriously, not only by the world outside of
theology proper, but also by the church. Vanhoozer himself admits that, "W e
have a long way to go fully to heal the Enlightenment split between biblical
studies and dogmatics."7 This healing is going to happen not by ignoring valid
criticisms of theology, or of theological method, but by engaging them. Paul
Helm, a theologian at Regent College in Vancouver has been critical of

6 Barry, "Speech Act Theory", 96.
7 Justin Taylor, "An Interview with Kevin Vanhoozer," The Gospel Coalition Blog, entry posted
May 11, 2009, http://thegospelcoalition.org/blogs/justintaylor/2009/05/ll/interview-with-kevin-vanhoozer/

(accessed May 16, 2011).
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Vanhoozer's thought. When these criticisms were brought up to Vanhoozer, he
acknowledged that Paul Helm had a point instead of simply criticizing Helm.8
This displays the very important hermeneutical virtue of humility that can be
found throughout Vanhoozer's writing.
In view of his importance, then, this thesis will examine aspects of the
development of Kevin J. Vanhoozer's thought through three of his most
important works to date: Is There a Meaning in this Text?, The Drama o f Doctrine,
and Remythologizing Theology.
In Chapter 1 ,1 will attempt to understand Vanhoozer's construal of the
biblical text as the communication of God, paying particular attention to his
major study, Is There a Meaning in this Text? I will examine the substance of
Vanhoozer's claim that the biblical text is the speech of God, and do so against
the backdrop of Vanhoozer's examination of literary theory and philosophy,
where a certain loss of trust in the written text has originated. Reading through
and understanding the relevant and preliminary material, or "clearing of one's
throat" as Vanhoozer says, is essential in order to understand why he is writing
on the topic of texts and authors. A portion of this treatment will be concerned
also with grasping the positions of the detractors, as Vanhoozer understands
them, of the text as the speech of God. I will argue that Vanhoozer believes that
those who question the Bible as the speech of God do so because of a few
common and overarching beliefs.9 The first has to do with texts in general, not
just the biblical text, although it is the text most devastated by this challenge. In

8 Guy Davies, "The Kevin Vanhoozer Interview/' Exiled Preacher Blog, entry posted September 27,
2007, http://exiledpreacher.blogspot.com/2007/09/kevin-vanhoozer-interview.html (accessed May 16, 2011).
9 The phrase "speech of God" may seem preposterous. In chapter 2 I investigate the author
Nicholas Wolterstorff and his philosophical treatment of how the Bible can be the speech of God.
Wolterstorff is an author upon whom Vanhoozer depends for the claim that God can truly be said to speak
even though he has no hands to inscribe or mouth to speak.
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much postmodern criticism it is believed that textual meaning as controlled by
something exterior is a myth. Meaning is wholly immanent and found within the
textuality of the text, in the play of signs. Derrida and deconstruction, for
instance, seek to overthrow the Western "idols of the sign."10 These idols include:
the idol of reliability, that the signs (words) correspond to reality; the idol of
determinacy, that the word makes sense in only one way, and that this way is
fixed; and finally the idol of neutrality, that the word is free from ideological
factors. In response, Vanhoozer reasserts the traditional view that authors are the
ones who decide on the meaning of their texts, and that authorial intention
grounds textual meaning. He does this in dialogue with a wide range of sources,
from Ordinary Language philosophers to Jürgen Habermas, from Speech-Act
theory to cognitive approaches to linguistics. This broad range of sources
requires, however, that I must simply sketch Vanhoozer's interpretation of such
sources. By no means do I wish to claim authoritative knowledge of the authors
or subjects cited.
In Chapter 2 , 1 will examine a second challenge to the biblical text as the
speech of God that comes from propositionalism. Propositionalism approaches
the biblical text as a location in which interpreters can primarily unearth "facts"
about God, the world, and humans. This will be recognized as the position of
more conservative or evangelical theologies. My personal development as a
Christian has been within this particular view of the world and the Scriptures.
I have, however, held for some time that propositionalism, while a
conceivable approach to some of the biblical text, is not broad enough to
encompass all that is happening in the text, and have looked for alternate ways of
reading and interpreting the Scriptures. The problem is that most alternative
10 Kevin Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text ("Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1998), 39.
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strategies do not view the text as the actual speaking of God, but rather offer a
whole other basis on which interpretation is made to rest. Vanhoozer, on the
other hand, maintains a version of the evangelical position which examines the
Bible as containing propositional content, but recognizes at the same time the
limitations of the propositional approach to such a rich and varied text. In an
interview published in Christianity Today and in response to a question
concerning evangelicalism's dependency on the propositional truth of Scripture
(often equated with inerrancy), Vanhoozer was quoted in the following terms:
'" I ’m not denying inerrancy, but it's not big enough.' It offers only a partial
rendering of the whole picture of biblical truth, compared to the wideness of
Scripture's narrative, song, poetry, and aphorism. 'We are trying to get away
from an idea of language simply picturing the world. A promise, for example,
has a much more complicated relationship to the self and others.'"11 The
propositionalist position of evangelicalism, in short, is a naive realist position
that is confident, or over confident, in the belief that the meaning of the text can
be construed under a true/false dichotomy without remainder. Propositionalism
thus reduces the many ways of communicating down to the ones that make
statements of fact. While not discounting the presence of the proposition in
Scripture, Vanhoozer responds with a new way of looking at the text that is
broader and accounts for the many other types of speaking that happen within
the Scripture, most especially the dramatic nature of God's speech which engages
his people through the biblical text. Of particular important to this thesis is the
fact that he examines the notion of God in communicative act, the one who
initiates and sustains a communicative relationship with people and therefore

n "Kevin Vanhoozer, Creating a Theological Symphony/7 Christianity Today, February 8,1999,
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/1999/february8/9t2038.html?start=2 (accessed May 16, 2011).
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offers a dramatic account of the text that expands and goes further than mere
proposition.
In Chapter 3 , 1 will examine the third challenge to the biblical text as the
speech of God that comes from a theological outlook which states that God
cannot communicate himself to us because of his otherness. This view holds that
examining the text for divine speech is to succumb to myth. God is just too
different, so completely alien to humanity that we may neither say anything
about him as he is, nor expect him to "speak" to us. Vanhoozer's contention is
that while he agrees that our speaking about God as if God were readily apparent
to our minds is false, it is not impossible fo r God to cross this boundary and say
something to us. While human limitations, sin, and our fallen world may get in
the way of hearing the word of God, God is able to cross the ugly ditch and speak
about himself, so that he is able to be in communication and say things that not
only commit us, but commit himself as he is in his being.
This relationship between humanity and God will have some unique
characteristics. Some theologians have taken those qualities unique to the
immanent Trinity and applied them to the God/human relationship. Vanhoozer
helps the reader to see the problems inherent in such a confusion of doctrinal
statements that conflate the immanent Trinity with the economic Trinity. He
provides a way in which we might understand the immanent Trinity by way of
God's communication with humanity without reducing the immanent to the
economic.
In my conclusion I will make a number of connections between
Vanhoozer's thought and authors who share similar views, in the hope that these
connections will generate further insight. Finally, I will offer my own view on
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the significance of the work of Vanhoozer, and on the possibilities that I see for
further development in areas that could make up for some of the limitations in
Vanhoozer's conception of God in communication with his people. More
specifically, I will ask questions about the account Vanhoozer offers of God
speaking outside of Scripture, and attempt to say something of the importance
and role of God's speaking throughout history and into the lives of people today.

10

Chapter 1 - The Communication of Meaning: The Divine Author and His Text

The notion of an author's intentions, communicated through the signs
used to convey meaning, is nothing new. In fact it is historically the
commonsense understanding of how meaning is communicated from one
person, separated by distance or time, through signs, or the written word, to
another. Vanhoozer accordingly says that, "The author is the foundational
principle in what we might call the traditional metaphysics of meaning."12 But in
the last century this belief in authors has come under scrutiny and many have
become suspicious of the "notion that signs are reliable indicators of the way
things really are."13 If signs are unreliable, then we must ask whether or not the
written word should be taken as a reliable means for an author to communicate
his or her intentions.
Maybe the truth is that texts don't require historical authors. If, for
instance, through the continual drift of tides and sand on a beach, stones were to
appear that came together to say something like, "No Smoking," would that be a
text? If we answer, "Yes it is a text," then what does this mean for any other text?
Would authors be inexorably tied to the text, needed for a text to be considered a
text, or would the author just be a convention?14

12 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 48.
13 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 43.
14 Jorge J. E, Garcia, "Can There be Texts Without Historical Authors," American Philosophical
Quarterly 31 no. 3 (July, 1994), http://find.galegroup.com.proxy2.1ib.uwo.ca:2048/gtx (accessed January 10,

2011).
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The theological import of this challenge to authors and their texts becomes
clear when we begin to reckon with the claim that God is an Author. As Mark
Taylor has said (stating that which he wishes to deconstruct):
God is not just any author, nor is His book just any book. God is the
Author of authors who dictates the Book of books. For this reason, God is
the Author to whom all authors finally defer, and His Book is the book to
which all other books ultimately refer.15
Vanhoozer takes this a step farther and says that God is not only the
Author of texts but "is the Author of being, of the book of nature," and through
his authorship the "meaning of the world has been inscribed..

therefore "God

is the Author of authors.. .." 16 But the interest of this chapter is not to locate the
Author of all Being, or of authors in general, but to ask what connection, if any,
there is between God the Author and the meaning of the biblical text in
particular, and why this connection is important.
Meaning: Premodem, Modem, Postmodern
The question of meaning is easily recognizable as a classic and perennial
metaphysical question. In premodern times Plato understood meaning as
imitation, in the sense that "eternal Ideas are reflected by temporal things, that
words in turn are reflections of things" and thus that a kind of trust exists
between the reality of being and our words about it.17 According to Plato,
Socrates is not completely convinced by this theory but is caught in holding it
because he believes humans can speak truly but will not seriously consider a
divine origin of language.18 In the Middle Ages, these categories are developed
in relationship to God and His being, and while the biblical text was an

15 Mark Taylor, Erring: A Postmodern AiTheology (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1984), 81.
16 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 47.
17 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 17.
18 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 18.
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important resource to discern God's being, it was not the only resource, as (on
some medieval views, at least) unaided human reason could also claim
knowledge of God's being.19
The move to modernity is a move away from "authoritative sources" in
general and therefore from the author-itative nature of texts.20 The moderns want
evidence for the foundations of knowledge. Descartes' Discourse on Method is a
perfect example of the switch in modern times. In Discourse on Method,
"Descartes challenges the Aristotelian view of scientific knowledge as deduction
from first principles and argues for a new model of scientific knowledge based
on scientific experience and mathematics."21 What Descartes' work amounts to
"is an impassioned plea for a new kind of hypothetico-deductive scientific
reasoning, for thinking on the basis of reason alone."22 This critical method, or
scientific method, became paradigmatic also among those who examined the
biblical text in modern times. The 19thcentury theologian Friedrich
Schleiermacher is an example of a 'modern man' who draws the scientific
method into the interpretation of the biblical text. Schleiermacher thinks that the
church should rely on "real specialists" in the historical and philological
disciplines rather than on theological or doctrinal resources for the interpretation
of Scripture.23 For many of the moderns, and even some more recent theologians,
the treasures of the Bible are not unlocked by faith. As Vanhoozer puts it, the
Jesus Seminar, for instance, "are still knee-deep in the 'critical' questions

19 Kevin Vanhoozer, First Theology: God Scripture and Hermeneutics (Downer Grove: InterVarsity
Press, 2002), 16.
20 Vanhoozer, First Theology, 17.
21 Kevin Vanhoozer, "Discourse on Matter: Hermeneutics and the "Miracle" of Understanding",
International Journal of Systematic Theology 1 no. 1 (January, 2005), 9.
22 Vanhoozer, "Discourse on Matter," 10.
23 Karl Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 1982), 155.
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concerning the reliability of the Bible," and many theologians "put their faith
more in their critical method than in the apparent meaning of the text."24
In postmodern times, meaning becomes even more problematic, in some
ways, for the reader of the Bible, as something exterior and stable has come
under attack from what Vanhoozer calls "Hermeneutical Non-realists." In this
group are deconstructionists, such as Derrida, neo-pragmatists like Richard
Rorty, and nihilists like Nietzsche. While no complete account of these sources
can be offered within the present limits, a brief account of each follows.
Derrida and Meaning
Jacques Derrida is an important postmodern conversation partner for
Vanhoozer, but as he says, this conversation is one of "indirect dialogue" since he
has no interest in letting Derrida set the tone for what he wants to say
constructively about "textual meaning, inspired by a Christian understanding of
God, language, and transcendence."25
Derrida's ideas and methods of interpretation are associated with the
movement known as "deconstruction." Deconstruction involves a "critique of
Western philosophy and of the entire hermeneutical tradition" which "all have in
common the promise of an absolute and secure knowledge."26 Derrida instead
wants "to pass beyond man and humanism, the name of man being the name of
that being who, throughout the history of metaphysics or of onto theology - in
other words throughout his whole history - has dreamed of full presence, the

24 Vanhoozer, First Theology, 17.
25 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 199.
26 Craig G. Bartholomew, "Deconstruction" in Dictionary for Theological Interpretation of the Bible, ed.
Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Craig G. Bartholomew, Daniel J. Treier, and N.T. Wright (Grand Rapids: Baker
Academic, 2005), 163.
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reassuring foundation, the origin and end of play."27 So while at first it may be
supposed that only theological conceptions of meaning would be challenged by
deconstruction, as theology most clearly locates meaning outside itself in God,
this is not so. Derrida, says Vanhoozer, has not only challenged theological
conceptions of meaning, but has positively (as far as theology is concerned)
perceived that "the loss of God leads to the loss of the knowing subject (the hero
of modernity) as w ell."28 Derrida correctly deconstructs the "premodern
Platonists and the modern propostionalists" who hold that "meaning is a matter
of naming, picturing, or referring to objects, facts, and the world," and therefore
he "cuts at the root of traditional western thought."29 It is Derrida's careful
deconstruction of the roots of traditional western thought about how language
relates to reality and the world that shows that every system of thought has
"stress points or fault lines that betray the fact of their construction - that is, their
non-natural, and hence arbitrary, nature."30 Where Plato (and those who have
followed in his wake) believed that the sign was a substitute presence for the
thing itself, Derrida claims that "neither language nor concepts latch onto the
real."31
Now it may seem at this point that the 'play' of deconstruction is simply
that of an overly exuberant child which has become destructive.32 But as
Vanhoozer says, deconstruction is more careful than destruction and should be
more clearly seen as a disassembling "whose aim is to expose the arbitrary
linguistic nature of their original construction"33 so that which seems to be

27Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1978), 292.
28 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 52.
29 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 53.
30 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 54.
31 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 55.
32 Vanhoozer, First Theology, 19.
33 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 52.
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absolute is seen instead to be dependent on a historical development and
legitimization. This questioning of 'reason' is, of course, going to cause problems
for philosophers because they depend on a non-theological stable meaning
within words and language. Deconstruction causes problems because it shows
that language is not quite as neat as we had thought it to be. Derrida believes that
language is underwritten by man-made constructs.
Neo-pragmaticists and Meaning
Richard Rorty and the neo-pragmatisists perform a similar move, a
decentralizing of reality, a deferral of a particular reality. Rorty attempts to show
that philosophy is not privileged as a means of clarifying reality. Philosophy is
simply one means of codifying reality to fit personal interests. What this means
is that there is no one "version" of reality, that there is no meaning which is can
be called the official one. Rather, because of the "ubiquity of language,"34 we can
never get outside of our socially constructed and arbitrary language conventions
that group realities according to cultural categories, and arrive instead at
absolute structures that represent how the world really is.
Stanley Fish, a literary critic, takes Rorty's theoretical pragmaticism and
applies it to texts, concretely showing why we should not indulge in an attempt
to read texts to "recover the author's mind or intention."35 Vanhoozer says that,
as far as a text is concerned, the communication of meaning as a function of its
author's intention is something impossible for Fish. The meaning of a text is not
something that the author fixes. Rather, meaning in a text is something that
"readers produce through their interpretive practices" as part of an "interpretive

34 Richard Rorty, "Pragmaticism and Philosophy," in After Philosophy: End or Transformation, ed.
Kenneth Bayes, James Bohman, and Thomas McCarthy (Cambridge, Mass,: MIT Press, 1987), 57.
35 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 56.
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community."36 The interpretive community has particular values which are
reflected in the way they interpret a text. The text is not a mirror of reality but a
mirror of the values of the community. In essence there is no meaning in the text,
but only what an interpretive community wants the text to say. Therefore
meaning is not "out there, to be discovered by reason, but is rather in the eye of
the beholding community."37
Nihilism and Meaning
Those knowledgeable with the aftermath of 19th century Idealism, and
specifically with Nietzsche, will not be surprised by the directions taken by the
20th century philosophers and literary theorists we have mentioned. Nietzsche, in
his time, was already talking about the human construction of meaning.
Nietzsche, says Vanhoozer, is accordingly part of the group of hermeneutical
non-realists. Nietzsche views language as irreducible, formed by human culture,
maintaining that it says something about us, and about how we see and
experience the world, rather than about reality, or about the world in itself.
Therefore Nietzsche would not be concerned with correct interpretation, because
"there is nothing to interpret, no truth of the matter to which our readings must
correspond or get right."38 All the distinctions that we make with language, the
words we believe most clearly represent the way things are are in the end,
"distinctions that make a meaningful world out of human experience ... [or]
linguistic creations."39
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Authorial Voice
What Vanhoozer contends is lost, or undone, by such movements is the
voice of the author. Voice, as a concept, joins the notion of speech and presence.
The authoritative voice (e.g. Reason) provides a stable centre from which there is
direct access to the world. Derrida calls the authoritative voice a misguided
"harmonious alliance" between reality, thought, and language, and labels it
Logocentrism.40 Logocentrism privileges the 'voice' of the author in the text
because speech (for the philosopher) is understood to be primary, and writing to
be a derivative which mediates the author's presence. Meaning then is
something that is in the mind of the author, or in the author's consciousness.
An authorial voice can be understood as the authoritative voice that
allows theology and philosophy to "ground their language and beliefs in
something that is not itself language."41 Derrida's response is that "voice" as
constituting authority outside language is a mirage, because language systems
are prior to thought and speech, and thus also prior to a metaphysics. The
stability of meaning outside of language is nothing more than "a white
mythology which assembles and reflects Western culture: the white man takes
his own mythology..., his logos - that is, the mythos of his idiom, for the universal
form of that which it is still his inescapable desire to call Reason."42
If it is true that the presence of a "voice" in writing is a myth, then
meaning is not something to be discovered in authors, nor is it something
signified by them. Meaning is rather "a ceaseless play of signs that never come to

40 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 60.
41 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 61.
42 Jacques Derrida and F.C.T. Moore, "White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy", New
Literary History 6, no. 1 (Autumn, 1974), http://www.jstor.org/stable/468341 (accessed April 16, 2011).
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rest on something in the w orld/'43 a signification that is "horizontal, never
vertical; immanent to language, not transcendent."44 Derrida's direction of
thought follows Ferdinand de Saussure's belief that meaning is "always
differential, never referential."45 If it is differential rather than referential then the
meaning attached to a particular set of signs is based not on the signs positively
referring to something, but is based instead on what they are not. Systems of
signs "m ean what they mean by differing from one another."4647These differences
are arbitrary and come from convention rather than an external ideal. So for
instance when someone is learning a language they really learn concepts "which
identify not given entities but socially constructed signifieds."A7
What then is writing; what is a text? Writing is an example of the
"deferral of presence" because what is present in writing is simply a system of
signs. A text is nothing more than free play, with no reality above the language.
Those who believe that they are grasping something outside of writing, the
author's voice, are in reality only reading their own voice into the text.48
Philosophers who have followed in the tradition of Descartes and have given
pride of place to consciousness as the locus of meaning are misguided, says
Derrida, because the subject is never fully self-consciousness. The author's
consciousness is "contaminated by language" and is never able to get outside of
this contamination, this language that is our venue for play.49
Differance is a term easily recognized today as associated with Derrida and
Deconstruction. Understanding differance is one of the keys to understanding
43 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 61
44 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 62.
45 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 61.
46 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 61.
47 Catherine Belsey, Critical Practice (London: Routledge, 1980), 44.
48 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 62.
49 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 63.
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Derrida. Differance says that "every reader approaches a text within a culture,
both influenced by and exerting influence upon the culture. Since this is an
infinite process of shaping and reshaping, interpretation is an endless, everchanging process, an infinite process of creation."50 Differance opposes
metaphysics, because instead of seeing writing as a means to something more
than itself, it sees writing as "a virus or parasite that prevents metaphysics from
ever functioning properly."51 This conclusion is a direct threat to philosophy and
theology because, for differance, meaning is never fixed but is differed. Meaning
cannot be found in the sign itself, but is a function of the differance of signs; a
deferring of meaning and the difference of signs. Derrida attempts not to get rid
of authors but to put them "in their place."52 He recognizes that authors are
historical entities and that they produce texts, but his claim is that they cannot
control the meaning of the text. Instead of being the determining factor in textual
meaning, "the author's determining will is inscribed as one factor amongst
others."53
Meaning and the Conscious Subject
With the claim, that the author's writing is not a stable home for meaning,
comes a parallel and simultaneous question. If the author's writing is not a stable
home of meaning, can instead the consciousness of the author as subject be
considered a stable home of meaning? Vanhoozer observes that, "The so-called
'masters of suspicion' - Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche - argue in different ways
that the human subject is neither self-conscious nor self-present. Nor is the
human subject a pure reason immune from the effects of history and culture. We

50 W. Randolph Tate, "Differance", Interpreting the Bible: A Handbook of Terms and Methods (Peabody,
Hendrickson Publishers, 2006).
51 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 64.
52 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 66.
53 Sean Burke, The Death and Return of the Author. Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 66.
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are more mastered by than masters o f our situation, more shaped by than shapers
of our tradition, culture, and language."54 The masters of suspicion are
ultimately suspicious of any claim that the human self is able to stand above and
beyond the body and master it. We are not sovereigns of our self but are affected
by unconscious desire and by ideology. Derrida has said that "logocentrism" is
an example of Western ideology, what he has called "white mythology."55 This
mythology has a controlling influence because philosophy and theology are
unwilling to be suspicious of the supposed connection between language and
reality, and of the concept of an "autonomous knowing subject."56 What
metaphysics has based its whole endeavor on is a "metaphysical pretention"
rather than a self-evident truth.57 Critics commonly take this a step farther.
Rather than simply calling the concept of author a mistake they insist that it is
instead a "repressive ideological construct that performs a political function."58
For one of these critics, Roland Barthes, the author represents not only a limit to
the text, but a theological or god construct.59 It is the god-like author who
controls the meaning of the text. But if the god-like author were to 'die', then he
cannot any longer contain or constrain the meaning of his text. Then the text
"becomes a playground on which readers can exercise their own creativity."60 In
fact, the death of the author is required for meaning to be decentralized. And for
this reason the "fates of the author of traditional literary criticism and of the God
of traditional theism stand or fall together."61

54 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 67.
55 Jacques Derrida and F.C.T. Moore, "White Mythology," 11.
56 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 68.
57 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 69.
58 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 69.
59 Roland Barthes, "The Death of the Author," in Authorship: From Plato to Postmodern: A Reader, ed.
Sean Burke (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995), 129.
60 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 70.
61 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 71.
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Those who have signaled the death of the author and of God do so
because both author and God assume an intelligence that stands outside
language and controls the meaning and truth of language. Who then is the one
speaking in the writing that we read? Whose voice is it that we hear when we
read? If it is not the author's voice, whose is it? Is it the reader's voice
pretending to be the author's? The "undoers" of meaning believe that the
authoritative voice we call the author's is not the author's at all but simply the
reader's voice. As Christopher Spinks has said, "These two developments - the
decentering of the human subject and author as an effect of the text - have led
some critics" (such as Derrida and Barthes) "to call for the death of the author for
the sake of the life of the text and reader."62
The Author's Intention
The death of the author has greater ramifications than, according to
Vanhoozer, it is often credited. Instead of another literary theory, it is a "critique
of the task of interpretation and of the way Western culture understood itself in
relation to the classic texts of literature, philosophy, and the Christian faith.
Traditionally the author's intention, as expressed by a text, was the place where
meaning was found. Derrida takes this idea and turns it upside down and
attempts to show that the author's intention cannot serve as the "ground and
goal of interpretation."63 Texts for Derrida are an "artificial and arbitrary system
of differences and distinction in terms of which an individual thinks and speaks"
that frustrate the intentions of the author rather than a means of communicating
clearly the mental intentions.64

62 D. Christopher Spinks, The Bible and the Crisis of Meaning: Debates on the Theological Interpretation of
Scripture (New York: T&T Clark, 2007), 74.

63 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 74.
64 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 74.
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There has been a number of authors who attempted a secular defense of
the author. One of these authors who defends authorial intention is E.D. Hirsch,
in his important work, Validity in Interpretation.65 Hirsch defines meaning as the
message that the author intends to convey via the text. We shall turn to Hirsch
shortly, but in the meantime, it must first be recognized that not all those who
have spoken about the intention of the author and its recovery through the text
mean the same thing. Friedrich Schleiermacher's position, for instance, is that
our personal "feeling" can provide us with the missing element that leads to
understanding that the author, fails to provide.66 Schleiermacher, as other
romanticists, believes that it is possible to have a direct apprehension of what
another thinks, that language is not a barrier but a segue to understanding such
that the author's mind and that of the reader meet.67
Hirsch, in his arguments, attacks the position that a text can have "a
meaning of its own."68 A text for Hirsch is what the author means, and from this
he draws the equally important conclusion that without authors there can be no
texts (or textual meaning). The reason is simple: texts are the result of intention,
and without the authorial intention that results in the writing of a text there can
be no meaning ascribed to those signs that we count as text. Intentionality, then,
is a quality of human consciousness, and "it is always about, or directed at,
som ething,"69 or an act by which consciousness aims at something. The meaning
of a text, therefore, is not the text itself, or a subjective mental act, but is
something associated with the "object" of that act,70 so that a text is meaningful

65 E.D. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967).
66 Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics and Criticism and Other Writings, trans. Andrew Bowie
(Cambridge University Press: New York, 1998), 147.
67 Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics and Criticism, 101.
68 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 75.
69 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 75.
70 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 76.
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because "somebody either means something by it or understands something
from it."71 So, contra romanticism, the event of the author's intending cannot be
reproduced, but its "object" can be.
Vanhoozer observes that, for Hirsch, interpretation is about getting at the
"author's intended meaning."72 To discover the intended object of an author's
consciousness is not easy. It requires a kind of scientific rigor to achieve
knowledge of the object thought of by the author. The reader uses the text to
think of the same object as the author, and thus interpretation can be seen as
"shared meaning."73 Meaning, then, cannot be reduced to the intentional acts of
either the author or of the reader in reproduction of meaning, but pertains to the
intentional object. Vanhoozer summarizes Hirsch's thought such that "an
interpreter grasps the meaning of a text when he or she experiences sameness of
content (or object) despite differentness of context."74 This does not, however,
mean that the present context is unimportant for the present day use of the text.
Hirsch says that the use of the text in different situations is a characteristic of
significance rather than of meaning. How a text is used has much to do with the
needs of the community or individual at the time and can have many
permutations. But significance is not meaning. Meaning is limited to the
intended object of the author and is determined by the author rather than the
reader.
There are numerous scholars who have attacked Hirsch's theory of the
intentionality of authors as the stable ground of meaning. Vanhoozer groups
these criticisms of Hirsch's theory into four fallacies and says that "any

71 Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, 4.
72 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 76
73 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 76.
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subsequent attempt to appeal to the author's intention.. .will henceforth have to
show how it is not guilty of these errors."75 The fallacies are, in brief, first, that
fallacy of relevancy which declares that a text as a verbal entity is complete and
functions well without any authorial biography. Vanhoozer rightly sees a hole in
this argument, since we need at the very least to know what language (which
pertains to the authors general context) a text is written in order to make sense of
it. The second fallacy is that of transparency. While Hirsch believes that the
conscious mind is knowable and that it is the place where stable meaning is
generated, his critics would point to the unconscious and supraconscious factors
that unknowingly affect the conscious subject. These sub- and supraconscious
factors are not negligible but affect the whole work and life of the subject. For the
critics, the fallacy of transparency is cured by the "hermeneutics of suspicion"
and its distrust of surface appearances.76 The third fallacy is that of identity and
is done when one looks to make the intention of the author and the meaning of
the resulting text one and the same. Critics have said that once a text is
produced, the text is no longer attached to the author but has a life of its own. To
equate text and author's intention is commit an ontological error of identifying
meaning with a mental phenomenon. The fourth and final fallacy is that of
objectivity; that the text, as an interpretive object, has a real independence. Here
Vanhoozer points to Hirsch's distinction between meaning and significance. This
important distinction is central to the work of hermeneutic realism because
without it, meaning is no longer definable, the very thing that hermeneutic non
realists claim. Critics claim that Hirsch's theory involves an outdated
objective/subjective binary opposition that does not hold any longer, in science,

75 Vanhoozer, is There a Meaning in this Text, 82.
76 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 83.
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language or anywhere else.77 Non-realists claim, against Hirsch, that the "object
of consciousness does not exist apart from the subjective acts of consciousness
that constitute it."78
So then, if Derrida, Rorty, Nietzsche and other "undoers" and hermeneutic
non-realists are correct, what do we do with authors? What would be the point
in acknowledging authors since nothing can be said of their mind, intention, or of
the meaning they intended to share in their writing? Or, more importantly for
theologians, "if signs in general are unreliable guides to reality, why should the
Bible be any different?"79 Hermeneutic non-realists do not believe in authors,
and their criticisms have influenced many in our postmodern times such that the
Bible has become a document of cultural interest but not a text through which
God can communicate meaningfully. God then, as the Author, cannot
communicate with us through the Bible because texts, as produced by authors,
are not in principle a "stable home of meaning."80
It may seem hard to credit that God and human authorship are tied
together, so that the criticism of authors affects the theological claim of God as
author of the biblical text, but Vanhoozer clarifies why this is so. He says that,
divine and human authorship "assume a kind of agency and intelligence that
stands outside language and controls it, making sure that words correspond to
the world guaranteeing the reliability of truth and speech."81 If human authors
are not present to their texts, then God the author is not present either, holding
by his authorship the meaning of what is said in the Bible. Furthermore, "If there
is no stable ground of meaning (no hermeneutical realism), then there is
77 Vanhoozer,
78 Vanhoozer,
79 Vanhoozer,
80 Vanhoozer,
81 Vanhoozer,
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ultimately nothing that stands over against our interpretations to challenge and
correct them ."82 What deconstruction has declared is not only the death of the
author, but as this is a theological claim, has signaled the death of God.
What does deconstruction mean for Christianity? It means that the basis
of our knowledge of God, the Bible, is no longer a reliable source for either facts
about God, the commands he has given, or, and maybe most tragically, the
promises of God, which in consequence are no longer effective for their call to a
relationship with God.83
God the Author in Communicative Action
Vanhoozer in fact presents deconstruction and neopragmaticist arguments
against authorship so well that it seems that Vanhoozer has backed himself and
other theologians into an inescapable corner: "The death of the Author and the
loss of belief in finding any kind of authorial m eaning.. .casts doubt on any
possibility of understanding the presence of God's meaning in a sacred text."84
The conclusion of deconstruction is that the Bible as the authoritative word of
God is "undermined by the instability of meaning because, if nothing is said, the
text cannot call for any specific response."85 This is a very unsatisfying position to
end with, not to mention that it does not picture the way we are moved and
transformed by words. If there is nothing outside the text then we "make
meaning a surface phenomenon of language only, wholly immanent."86

82 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 85.
83 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 86.
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What Vanhoozer will argue, however, is that God is actually present as the
Author of the biblical text specifically, and as the one who underwrites language
in general.87 What deconstruction has undone, in Vanhoozer's opinion, is the
pretense of rational objectivity that science and philosophy have for many years
relied upon, and this serves a useful function for the theologian in postmoderity.
Deconstruction ironically proves that "God is the condition for the possibility of
meaning..." not human reason.88 No longer do theologians have to justify their
theology by standards assumed by modern science or modern philosophy
(although these still provide valuable tools), rather they can develop theories,
and are correct to build theories of meaning that begin with God and with
Scripture! Vanhoozer therefore proposes that deconstruction opens up the
possibility of a "Christian understanding of God, language, and transcendence,"
because "any account of meaning and interpretation is already theological."89
Theological Foundations for Vanhoozer's Response
The heart of the "resurrection of the Author" in Vanhoozer's approach is
the doctrine of the Trinity. The Trinity provides a number of interesting
opportunities for understanding the Author, but what Vanhoozer says (adapting
Karl Rahner's trinitarian theology) shines forth most clearly is that God is the one
who communicates himself, i.e., he is trinitarian self-communication. This self
communication of the triune God provides us with a new "paradigm of what is
involved in all true communication."90 Meaning, therefore, must take on a new
definition to accommodate this connection between authorship and
communication. For what is entailed in this connection that Vanhoozer makes is

87 George Steiner, Real Presences (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1989), 3.
88 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in this Text, 198.
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nothing less than a redefinition of meaning. Vanhoozer's position bears quoting
in full:
Let us henceforth think of meaning not as something that words and texts
have (meaning as noun) but rather as something people do (meaning as
verb). Better said: a word or text only has meaning (noun) if some person
means (verb) something by it. "M eaning/' like the word "act," refers not
only to what is done but to the process of doing it. We can then say of
meaning what has been said of guns: words don't kill (or state, or
question, or promise, etc.); people do. Meaning, therefore, is not an
indeterminate thing, much less the intermediate state of a sleeping text
that must be wakened to life, but a determinate action.91
To locate meaning Vanhoozer begins with authorial action and what the
author does with language. For God language is the means of communion with
humanity.92 That the Word was "with God" means that a kind of language is in
God. So "language" is a medium of intra-trinitarian communion before all time.
If we start from the perspective that language is eminently present in God, and
that he instituted language for further communion (albeit at to a lesser degree)
with humanity, then there is the opportunity to believe that God through literary
means is attempting communication with us, and that as an Author he is actually
saying something. "For Augustine," says Vanhoozer, "the purpose of the city of
language is to lead one to the city of God. Language exists for the sake of
communication."93 Where for Derrida, deconstruction language always stayed at
the level of the sign and was simply a venue of "play" Vanhoozer believes that
language is at its best, a venue for "joy" with God.
In the rest of this chapter, I will examine Vanhoozer's development of the
idea of communicative action from its basis in a God who speaks. This will

91 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text, 202-203.
92 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text, 204.
93 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text, 202.
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involve response to the philosophers upon whom Vanhoozer leans to define
communicative action, a theory that is central to his thought and to the
development of his theological conception of God as Author of meaning. It
provides the "communicative ideals" that allow "Vanhoozer to continue to speak
of the author and the author's intentions without falling into the traps of much
modernistic psychologizing, of the endless abyss of postmodern freeplay."94
Vanhoozer, then, makes a connection between sentences and humans that
is foundational for his endeavor. For him both sentences and humans are
properly basic. They cannot be reduced any farther, at least as far as meaning is
concerned. So, for instance, while a human can be studied in her component
parts it is not the case that the human can be reduced to these particular parts
(whether mental or physical) and still be considered a representation of a whole
human. In the same way a sentence cannot be reduced to its parts and still retain
the meaning that is found in the sentence.
Paul Ricoeur breaks down the picture that is usually understood to reflect
the structural relation between developments of meaning from the sign to the
sentence. He states emphatically that there is "no linear progression from the
phoneme to the lexeme and then on to the sentence and to linguistic wholes
larger than the sentence. Each stage requires new structures and a new
description."95 Based on this clarification of the sentence, where verb and noun
mean have their meaning, it is clear that sentential meaning is not found by
further reduction, but is of a nonreducible type. Ricoeur says that a sentence "is
made up of words, but it is not a derivative function of its words. A sentence is

94 Spinks, The Bible and the Crisis of Meaning, 82.
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made up of signs, but is not itself a sign."96 The meaning of a sentence is lost if
we try to discover its meaning through semantics (the study of signs). The
connection is that sentences and the humans that mean something by uttering or
inscribing them have meaning in their whole not in their parts. If this is true,
then deconstructionists are on rocky ground.
By Ricoeur's and Vanhoozer's rationale, it becomes clear that
deconstructionists attempt to dethrone the author by showing the instability and
play of signs has very little to do with the sentence where meaning is found.
While the sign may be arbitrary, its use in a sentence cannot be arbitrary if it is to
convey meaning. While we can study uttered words, we cannot get at an
understanding of the personal action of the one who uttered by looking at
semantics alone. For instance, "A promise is a basic particular - a speech act of a
responsible communicate agent - that resists all attempts to reduce it to causal
laws, either of physics or of socio-linguistics."97
What Vanhoozer develops by examining the textual level at which
communication happens is a clear picture of the structure we need in order to
make a move from the biblical basis of theology to a philosophical explanation of
those foundations. He takes the Bible as true and then shows that the created
nature of language gives us the best model for understanding language. From
his perspective the Bible is God in communicative act, that God is the preeminent
speaker, and most importantly that God communicates with humans primarily
through some form of speech.98

96 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 7.
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The main point here is that language is part of the plan of creation, a
purposeful addition by God to the human construct. Not only is it purposeful
but it is part of the "design" and with design comes a "proper function."99 Here
Vanhoozer again makes a parallel with another well worked out thesis, this one
concerning the proper function of human cognitive facilities as developed by
Alvin Plantinga. Whereas the proper function of cognitive facilities leads to true
belief, the proper function of our communicative faculties produces "true
interpretation - understanding."10010 Plantinga's theory, while interested in
epistemological questions, provides the framework for beginning with a divine
design plan for language rather than a naturalistic-evolutionary model.
As we have already stated, God has a plan with language, to communicate
with his people. Language is the medium of “covenantal relationships with God,
with others, with the world."m This clarifies the proper function of language in the
divine purpose. It is not only understanding that communication is geared
toward when functioning properly, but relationship. Understanding, then, might
be said to be the broad way to classify the proper function of language and
understanding as functioning properly in specific cases when language enables
relationship.102
Philosophical Foundations for Vanhoozer's Response
There have been numerous defenders of meaning in language and
Vanhoozer highlights some of the philosophers who have attempted such a
defense, and from whom he is going to borrow in order to create his own theory
of communicative acts as it applies to God the Author of the biblical text. He
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says that he appropriates elements of these philosophies "only insofar as they
serve as handmaidens to my (theologically derived) picture of language as a
covenant of discourse."103
Ordinary language and Meaning
The first theory he mentions is that of ordinary language which include
the thought and work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin and John Searle.
Ordinary language theory is developed around the belief that "language can only
be understood in the situation and circumstances of its use."104 The contribution
of ordinary language theory is that it attends to "circumstances and specific
situations," and defines these limits as important in the words that we say.105
Wittgenstein and Use
Vanhoozer first looks to Wittgenstein, an important philosopher in a
number of theologically motivated theories of language. In his mature position
as represented in the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein produces a model
of language that shows that it is the "situation in which a word is uttered or
written" that gives us the nature of a word as word (name), or word as
proposition. A word as name is nothing as far as language is concerned. A word
becomes meaningful when it is part of a language-game. One might ask by way
of analogy, what is a chess piece called 'king' apart from the game of chess? It is
meaningless. But when we utter the name 'king' in the context of the game, we
give the piece a role in the game, and so it is that with the language game, a word
(or letter) becomes a "means of representation."106 Thus, language for
Wittgenstein is not meaningful through ostensive definition (pointing to a thing
103 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text, 267. Note 26
104 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text, 208.
105 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text, 209.
106 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1968), 25e.
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and uttering a particular sound), nor is language found to be meaningful by
getting down to basic, or primary elements. Language is meaningful only in use,
within a language game.
f.L. Austin: Doing things with Words
The second philosopher of ordinary language upon whom Vanhoozer
draws heavily is J. L. Austin. Austin's major contribution to philosophy is the
theory of the speech act found in his book How to Do Things with Words. It is
Austin's main point that "saying is also a kind of doing."107 The focus of Austin's
theory is "not on the representative properties of a sentence but rather on the
action the sentence performs."108 His classification of linguistic acts is three-fold.
First there is the locutionary act: this is simply the utterance of words. The
second is the illocutionary act: this is what we do in saying something. The third
is the perlocutionary act: this is what is brought about by saying something. The
theory itself is complicated, and Austin's presentation of it is so confusing that it
has led to a number of different interpretations that need not detain us.109
John Searle and Rule Governed Behavior
John Searle, for his part, is an important interpreter of Speech Act theory,
and is an important support for the theory of communicative action that
Vanhoozer is building. Searle orients himself to the question of meaning by
asking how we get "from the physics to the semantics?" 110 After all, how can we
account for the everyday language based interactions we have with one another
that allow for transactions, promises, commands etc.? How do these sounds that

107 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text, 209.
108 Spinks, The Bible and the Crisis of Meaning, 85.
109 Richard S. Briggs, Words in Action: Speech Act Theory and Biblical Interpretation (New York: T&T
Clark, 2001), 38-40.
110 John Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1983), 27.
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we emit or write accomplish the things that they do? The way words mean
something is found by recognizing that meaning is not found in the inscription or
the utterance of words, but is found in a "rule-governed form of behavior" and in
the action of "doing" meaning.111 Meaning is a process, "a determinate action" of
responsible communicative agents in inter-subjective social situations.112
This has some important ramifications for the basic construct of meaning.
If meaningful communication is accomplished by a determinate action in a social
setting, then words and signs will not be considered the basic units of meaning,
as in Ferdinand Saussure's work, but rather sentences will be seen as the basic
units of meaning, because it is through sentences that personal actions are
determined. "W e get from the physics to the semantics, from noises in the air or
marks on paper to meaning, only by assuming that these noises or marks are
produced by beings who are using language in order to relate to others. Using
language to communicate involves following certain socially agreed-upon
rules."113 We grasp meaning, then, within the framework of rules, and we
distinguish the rules in force by knowing the context in which an utterance is
made. Texts, for instance, as a species of speech act, are governed by rules
determined by the literary form. Gospel, for instance, is a literary form, and
plays an important part in determining the rules which apply in grasping the
meaning intended by the author.114
Paul Ricoeur, Ordinary Language Theory and the Literary Text
One may be tempted to think that Vanhoozer wholeheartedly accepts
ordinary language/speech-act theory, but this would be incorrect. Vanhoozer has
1,1 John Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1969), 12.
112Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text, 203.
1,3 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text, 209.
114 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text, 210.
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not forgotten Derrida's insightful criticism that the concept of 'normal' is
ideologically driven, and therefore, for Vanhoozer, speech-act theory is limited in
its ability to completely "restore trust in language and authority to the author."115
The answer, says Vanhoozer, is to look for a "divine convention" or a "structure
of creation" that God uses to underwrite language.
The question arises more particularly with the question of how ordinary
theory, which is interested in speaking discourse, applies to literary text, or if it
applies at all. The philosophical resource he relies upon to untangle the speaking
and the writing connection is Paul Ricoeur.116 To focus on sentences in texts is the
key element in understanding reading, or writing as discourse, and in seeing
how ordinary theory of language applies. If meaning is found in sentences then
discourse is preserved because the sentence retains the key to discourse:
"something said to someone about something."117 Discourse is a matter of not
just reading texts to discover the details of the text as text, but is a way to receive
meaning from another distant source. For this reason, the interpretation of texts,
hermeneutics, "is not merely a matter of knowing things about texts" but is a
means of discoursing with that distant text.118 Vanhoozer believes that Ricoeur's
"whole philosophy is an investigation into how language can exert a
transforming effect on readers."119
What needs to be distinguished from Vanhoozer's perspective is where
the author is in this discourse. Ricoeur does not believe that the author is an
active participant in the discourse. The author and his or her intention is part of

115 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text, 214.
1,6 Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action, and Interpretation,
ed. and trans. John B. Thompson (New York : Cambridge University Press, 1981).
117 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text, 214.
118 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text, 214.
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the event of writing, but these are not present or required for the meaning which
we access, or discourse with today.120 So what does the reader actually come to
discourse with? Again, Vanhoozer says that Ricoeur turns away from any
uncovering of the "mind of the author" or "intention of the author" to focus on
the text as bearer of a proposed world of being for our "consideration and
response."121 Vanhoozer thus believes the claim that the author's intention is
unimportant to the meaning of the text to be untenable. "After all," he says,
"things do not get said on their ow n."122
Jiirgan Habermas and Communicative Action
Vanhoozer's third philosophical resource for thinking about language as a
communicative act is Jiirgan Habermas's theory that understanding relies on
"structures of inter-subjectivity that are implicit in communication.123 These
implicit structures can be seen as a "transcendental language game, with
universal rules, that all competent speakers invariable play."124 What this
amounts to, for Habermas, as Vanhoozer sees things, is to make meaning no
longer something found in an author or his intention particularly, but as
something that is part of the community formed in discourse and of the norms
"inherent in language use."125
From these three philosophical resources, ordinary language theorists,
Ricoeur, and Habermas, Vanhoozer has the makings of an "action model of
meaning" that will best represent the full spectrum of the text as communicative
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action.126 Meaning, when defined under the rubric of communicate action, is
present in texts "because someone has said something about something to
som eone."127 Because someone in particular is saying something definite to
someone, we are able to define a whole host of particulars that will help us get to
the author's meaning. What is said by an author is said at a particular time and
place; it is said, furthermore, by a person of a culture and language group,
positioned socially and historically so that they can only discourse with us
through texts.
The Text is...
Texts, broadly, for Vanhoozer, are the historically conditioned intention of
the author realized at a remote distance in the future by a reader/interpreter who
recognizes the intention of the author to say something. The interpreter's task is
to discover what was said and what was meant to be said.128 Only by
interpreting the intention of the author well will we be able to engage in effective
discourse. One can engage in discourse when each is communicating effectively
and each is giving respect to the author's communicative action as valid
meaningful activity.
This activity of communication, the action itself, can be subdivided by a
distinction between doing "the deed" of communication, or to the "energy" or to
the "form and matter" of what ones does.129 Vanhoozer points to Wilhelm
Dilthey as one of the original movers who shifted the human sciences, and
therefore the hermeneutical method, to a position of seeking understanding
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through thinking "oneself back into the mind of an author, to reproduce the
author's psychology and so relive the author's experience."130
Vanhoozer contrasts Dilthey's seeking out the meaning of discourse
behind the text with covenantal discourse, which preserves the agent as one who
does things and the agent who is "irreducible." For Vanhoozer an interpreter
cannot get behind the agent to find some other cause or power that is responsible
for the action without abdicating human freedom and reasonability.131
The connection that Vanhoozer is going to great lengths to make is the one
between an author's meaningful action and the speech act.132 The goal is to show
how interpreting texts is similar to interpreting actions, something we do every
day in our regular lives. This takes the interpreting of texts out of the realm of a
mysterious activity and makes it normal and a part of the way we do things in
living. He says that he views "communication as the action that puts a language
system into motion at a particular point in time by realizing certain possibilities
offered by the code."133
The Relationship of the Communicative Act, Text and Author
The text can now be redefined by Vanhoozer as "a communicative act o f a
communicate agent fixed by writing."134 This clarifies Vanhoozer's position against
the romantics who look for textual meaning in the consciousness, or subjectivity
of the author, and instead offers a stable ground for meaning in the text itself, in
the communicative act. Vanhoozer's conceptual model is able to overcome the
limitations of Hirsch's theory because in keeping to the text the focus is on what
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is publicly available rather than what is inferred by the text. And just as acts are
a fixed part of history, so a text written is an act that is fixed in the past and is
part of history as well, and is therefore determinate and can be studied as any
other historical event.135
Vanhoozer's position is therefore that a text is something authors create,
and that the meaning of the text is controlled by the author. The next question to
be dealt with is this: what is an author? While Descartes saw the human person
(and therefore the author) as a solitary sovereign subject, Derrida has shown that
this picture of the human is flawed and undoes the Cartesian picture. What
Vanhoozer offers is not a restatement of Descartes theory of the subject but a
viable alternative to Cartesian duality, an "intersubjective communicative
agency."
Vanhoozer's idea of authors as communicative agents does not do away
with Saussure or Derrida, but situates the "differential system of signs" within
the author. Since it is the author who activates the system of language, it is "the
author who initiates an event of discourse, the author who means."136 And the
author means, not in a vacuum but through publicly rule-governed behavior of
language. The reason there is meaning in a text is because a "human author at a
particular place and time activated the linguistic resources that were to hand" to
accomplish a particular intentional act.137
Whereas some, like Derrida, could be said to worship at the level of the
sign, Vanhoozer believes that meaning does not stop at the level of those verbal
marks; it cannot be reduced to vocabulary and syntax, although it cannot be
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accomplished without these things. Part of the task as Vanhoozer presents it,
then, is to reconstruct the author's intention while taking into account how
deconstruction has undone the psychologizing tendencies of intention. Author's
intention in Vanhoozer’s proposal is not an aspect of the author's private
psychology but of their action involving public context and good.
The Communicative Act and Intention
A number of philosophers define intention as "directedness."138 Whenever
we are intending something, we point our attention, our mind, toward that thing.
On this model, intending always has an object to which it is pointing.
Communicative action can be understood as an aspect of an author's
directedness, or intention. An author not only has an object to which he or she is
attentive, but by "in-tending" to the words used, the author tends to two things,
both the subject of his or her attention and also to the illocutionary force of the
words chosen.139 Searle, says Vanhoozer, believes that speech acts can be
attended to in different ways. All statements have propositional content, and we
can discuss and understand the content in various ways. What creates the
variety of ways that propositional content can be understood is the "force" of the
content, that the words can be taken as a "statement, a question, a command" or
something else.
A proposition's intention, as configured as the author's attended meaning,
gives a way beyond the hermeneutical impasse that is often reached by not
making this clarification of intention. Intention is not about the psychology of
the author, getting into his or her mind, but is rather a matter of knowing what
kind of text as communicative act the author is attending to, what particular
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object and particular force the author was enacting.140 When a reader takes up a
text, understanding happens when "both the author and reader attend to the
same matter in the same manner."
Vanhoozer asks us to consider the wink. What makes a wink something
other than a simple rapid eye movement, a blink? Both are physiologically the
same, yet there is something that makes one a communicative act and another
just a physical phenomenon. It is the intention of the agent to communicate, that
makes the rapid opening and closing of the eye a wink. If we are to try and
explain the wink just by "brute" facts we miss the wink. Vanhoozer concludes
that it is therefore "wrong to attempt to explain intentional action in terms of
involuntary events, just as it is misguided to reduce communicative acts to
semiotic laws."141 To put it another, simpler way, the whole act is greater than
the sum of the physical parts. This is easily transferred to the author of the text.
The intention of the author is what holds the textual communicative act together,
unifies it and makes it more than a string of words.
Vanhoozer finds an ally for his position in recent work on consciousness.
In the mind-body debate, consciousness, like intentional action in general,
requires "a different set of predicates to describe it." This is because meaning
and mind display what are called emergent properties. An emergent property is
something that "characterize higher order phenomenon (e.g. the brain) that
displays new proprieties (e.g., mental rather than physical) and requires new
categories (e.g. the mind) to describe them ."142 This is the counter to
postmodernism reduction of meaning to material signs. There is a complexity
within communicative acts that cannot be reduced, complexity that requires new
140 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text, 247.
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categories to account for the emergence of textual meaning. This category is the
author's intention.
The Communicative Act and God as Author of Meaning in the Bible
How does authorial communicative action and intention relate to the
Bible? Appealing to intention gets us to the level of the human writers, but if we
understand the Bible as having a divine Author, how do we, or can we, account
for divine intention? Some, especially in medieval times believed that the divine
Author of the Bible intended a fuller meaning behind and beyond what the
human authors could have meant.143 One important and concrete example for
Christians and the fuller meaning of a text might be Isaiah 53, and the claim that
it refers to the passion of Jesus Christ. Could it truly be referring to Jesus Christ
when obviously the human authors were not aware of Jesus? This could only be
possible if we are willing to "acknowledge the possibly of divine authorship."144
Where we locate divine intention, says Vanhoozer, is not at the level of verbal
inspiration, but at the level of canon as divine communicative act.145 This would
mean, to bring in a previous 'Vanhoozerian' idea, that the canon has emergent
properties that cannot be categorized at the level of the individual books
themselves but that is, rather, displayed only at the level of the whole, and in this
case the whole as the Word of God, a unified communicative act. What we
discover at the level of the canon is the intention of God, an intention that
"supervenes on the intention of the human authors."146 So at the level of canon,
Isaiah 53 was indeed referring to the Christ. We know this not because the
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individual book Isaiah claims it, or because Isaiah himself knew the Christ, but
because the canon taken as a whole "specifies the referent."147
In this chapter I have shown the development of Vanhoozer's
interpretation of the death of the author and his attempt to rehabilitate meaning
as a function of the author of the text. This had direct implications for the biblical
text where, through triune communicative action, God speaks to humans at the
level of the whole canon. In the next chapter I will be taking a closer look at how
Vanhoozer fills out this relation of divine Author and authorship to the canonical
text through an exploration of the drama of the biblical text as opposed to a strict
propositonalistic account.

147 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text, 265.
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Chapter 2 - Communicative Act and Canonical Linguistic Theology

At the heart of the gospel is communicative act. The gospel, on such
terms, is the most powerful and dramatic speech event of all time. The self
communication of God through and in Jesus Christ, the heart of the gospel, gives
us insight into the nature of all God's acts. In particular, it shows that that they
are communicative. God works in many ways through human history, as attested
in the Bible: first of all in creation; then in the election, rejection, and restoration
of Israel; and then in "Jesus: God's definitive W ord/Act."1 All are communicative
acts of God, which benefit us most clearly when, understanding the Bible as the
norm of Christian faith and practice, we are drawn into dialogue with God.
As Vanhoozer points out, however, large numbers of theologians question
whether the biblical text should be seen as authoritative, and ask instead whether
authority for faith and practice should not rather be located in the reader, the
community, or some other place.2 To say where such authority for faith and
practice is found is thus to decide whether or not God speaks in an authoritative
way. Vanhoozer maintains the classical view that human knowledge of God
does not have its origins in human reason, in the "genius-philosopher," but in the
message that has been revealed through the prophets and apostles. He suggests,
accordingly, that the challenge for those who have not themselves witnessed
God's Word is largely one of access, an access that was afforded the prophet or
apostle, and that must now, in a manner of speaking, be opened to others. Thus
the question arises: Where is divine revelation found by the common believer?
There are four possible sources of knowledge of God that Vanhoozer identifies:
1 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 3.
2 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 4.
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biblical propositions, the person of Christ, Christian piety, or church practice.
The one that I will focus our attention on in this chapter is that of biblical
propositions.3
Vanhoozer points out that "there is a long-standing tendency to identify
divine revelation with biblical assertions or statements. These propositional
statements have been considered to be the prime instances of truth-bearing
language."4 This is a view, however, that Vanhoozer wishes to transcend in his
theology, and to replace with a much more subtle account of the theology of
Scripture. In this chapter, I propose to examine Vanhoozer's criticism of
propositionalism, which he regards as an inadequate way to understand biblical
texts, and to attempt to discover how his view of the Bible as understood in the
light of the idea of God in communicative act provides, in his judgment, a more
adequate way of conceiving the biblical text. This is an important point, because
Vanhoozer associates himself with evangelicals, who are numerically the
majority of American Protestant Christians, and who historically have been
massively in favor of understanding the Bible as propositional revelation.
Vanhoozer appears to be aware that to convince his evangelical readers that there
is more to the Bible than propositions is going to be a difficult task.
At the same time, Vanhoozer's proposals also have in view another
audience, who have been prominent in a range of "mainline" religious
scholarship in the United States: the so-called "post-liberals" associated with
names such as George Lindbeck and Hans Frei. Vanhoozer hopes to show post
liberal theologians also that there is no need to be completely averse to the idea of
3 All of these possible sources of knowledge of God are important, but Vanhoozer focuses on those
which have to do specifically with the Scriptures, and so I follow this path as well. In my conclusion I will
question whether or not this one dimensional focus can rightfully be maintained by Vanhoozer if he intends
to develop a full orbed theology of God in communicative act.
4 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 4.
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the proposition, rightly understood, in approaching the meaning of revelation.
Post-liberalism is often associated with the generic hermeneutical standpoint
which locates meaning in communal use, so that its biblical hermeneutics could
be taken, at the most general level, to be akin to certain of the positions surveyed
in the previous chapter of this thesis (and to which Vanhoozer took exception). In
what follows in the present chapter, I will be working mainly from Vanhoozer's
recent study, The Drama o f Doctrine, in an attempt to show how it is that he offers
another way to conceive of the biblical text that avoids, on the one side, a strictly
propositional conception of the Bible, and on the other, a view of the biblical text
as shaped fundamentally by its use within the ecclesial community.
The biblical text, from the propositionalist's perspective, is understood
effectively as the place to retrieve "data about God," and more importantly, the
outlook it represents "seems to presuppose the quintessential^ modern form of
epistemology, namely, foundationalism."5 But as we found in Chapter 1,
postmoderns have shown how culturally relative the project of modernity was,
and thus brought the propositionalist project under question in their
deconstruction of it. The postmoderns have now located authority, after the
infamous linguistic turn, not in the author, or in reason or experience, but in the
text as handled in "tradition, understood as a community's habitual practices."6
This idea takes hold in American theology in particular through Lindbeck's
seminal study, The Nature o f Doctrine, where community practice, within a

5 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 5 and 292. Some would call Vanhoozer's approach canonical
foundationalism. Vanhoozer says that this is an incorrect association because he argues against classical
foundationalism, an epistemology that likens what we know to a pyramid based on a set of indubitable
beliefs. Vanhoozer, on the other hand, takes into consideration the particular kinds of text, and the
particular location and identity of the exegete, as being significant in the flowering of knowledge. For a
highly regarded treatment of foundationalism verse nonfoundationalism see, Nancy Murphy, Beyond
Liberalism and Fundamentalism: How Modern and postmodern Philosophy Set the Theological Agenda (Valley Forge,
PA: Trinity Press International, 1996).
6 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 10
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cultural-linguistic model, appears to be the source of theological authority.7
Vanhoozer speaks of his work in The Drama o f Doctrine as a whole as an attempt
to "correct (without overreacting to) this cultural-linguistic misstep by locating
authority not in the use of Scripture by the believing community but in .. .divine
authorial discourse," or in other words, in the divine author's speech about
himself.8
This correction that Vanhoozer attempts will hinge on some important
principles. First, Vanhoozer will maintain that the Christian way is dramatic,
and therefore that it involves speech and action. Second, what is required to
correct the excesses of modernism in theological scholarship is not a culturallinguistic approach to the biblical text, but what Vanhoozer calls a "canonicallinguistic" one in which the "normative use" of language "is ultimately not that
of ecclesial culture but of the biblical canon."9 The purpose of this approach is to
attempt to retrieve the Protestant principle of sola sciptura, though not merely as a
principle but rather more as a dramatic practice, a practice that entails
corresponding in one's speech and action to what God has already said and done
as narrated in the Scriptures.
It has, for many years, been the practice either to abstract doctrine from
biblical exegesis, which is to say, to attempt to reiterate Scripture in clear
propositional-dogmatic terms, or to focus on propositional statements in the
Scriptures as such. Both of these methods, however, de-dramatize the Scriptures,
by taking the voice of the Author from the text so that he no longer speaks
through it. Vanhoozer attempts to re-position the communicative act of God at

7 See the critique provided by Alister McGrath, The Genesis of Doctrine (Cambridge, Mass: Basil
Blackwell, 1990), 26-32.
8 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 11.
9 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 16.
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the heart of his canonical-linguistic approach so that what the Author has said is
what Christians take as the norm for and in Christian living.10 He hopes through
this approach to overcome the impasse that exists between propositionalist and
nonpropositionalist modes of conceiving revelation, Scripture, and theology, in
order to move towards what he describes as a "postpropositionalist Scripture
principle."11
The canonical-linguistic approach, on Vanhoozer's account, resists the
reduction of God's involvement with Scripture to one mode only. To say that
God is in communicative act through the Scriptures entails one of the central
qualities of speech in general - that is its diversity. God says and does, and does
so in "dialogical action, where saying is a form of doing."12 Scripture is thus to be
seen as a site of dialogical action, where saying and doing meet, and where all
speech acts originate in God. Humans on this view do not know anything of God
that God has not first communicated. What gives human speech about God
significance, therefore, is that it is a response or repetition of what God has
already said.
Before we discuss Vanhoozer's postpropositionalist response, we need to
clarify how he construes the propositionalist position. What propositionalism
means is no easy task to specify, either in the philosophical or theological
arenas.13 The Oxford Companion to Philosophy says that a proposition as defined by
modern logic is "what is asserted when a sentence (an indicative, or declarative,
sentence) is used to say something true or false, or as 'what is expressed by' such
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a sentence."14 Evangelicals, for their part, commonly refer to their position
concerning the nature of Scripture as "propositional revelation."15 What they
refer to, in using this term, is that revelation discloses truth in a cognitive
manner. However, there are difficulties that need to be resolved here, because
not every theologian or philosopher means exactly the same thing when using
the term "proposition." There is both the "ordinary" sense of the word
"proposition," and the "philosophical" sense, and quite apart from any other
difficulty, both these senses are used by evangelical theologians when discussing
the propositions of the Bible.
First let us examine the proposition in the sense used by philosophers. The
philosophical approach holds that the meaning of a proposition is abstract, or
that its meaning is not attached directly to a particular word or set of words. So,
for instance, the statements, "It's raining," and, “II pleut," mean the same thing
even though the meaning is expressed differently in different languages.16 The
difference of words does not change that fact to which the words refer. Are
propositions, then, "semi-platonic entities?" A number of philosophers think so,
and hold that meaning is part of a "third world of objective contents of
thought"17 The hinge point for Christians concerning the proposition, a
statement which can be characterized by being true or false, is what the truth or
falsity applies to in a proposition, the sentence, or the meaning. W. V. Quine says
"that the truth predicate serves 'to point through the sentence to the reality; it
serves as a reminder that though sentences are mentioned, reality is still the

14 Colwyn Williamson, "Proposition", The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, ed. Ted Honderich (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 724.
15 Vanhoozer, The Semantics of Biblical Literature, 56.
16 Vanhoozer, The Semantics of Biblical Literature, 60.
17 Vanhoozer, The Semantics of Biblical Literature, 61.

50

whole p oin t'"18 Thus for Quine truth is not found in language, or in the words
themselves, but in the reality to which language points. In the case of biblical
propositions, the philosophical sense of the proposition is used positively when
"sentences are translated into a clearer, more explicitly propositional form"; at its
farthest reaches, such an approach would entail that we take the "raw " biblical
text and derive from it a more "precise discursive language" which might be
spoken of as "biblical propositions."19
By the same token, however, biblical propositions can also be understood
as ordinary propositions or verbal statements. On this view, says Vanhoozer,
"actual sentences assume primacy" and need only be repeated, whether in the
original language or in translated equivalents.20
The danger of both these views is that they render revelation as "abstract
and lifeless, dulling the call of the gospel for decision and obedience."21
Propositions are generally taken as assertive in nature, and the assertion for
many biblical propositionalists amounts to a flat statement of "facts." This
category of assertion, then, when applied to the Bible, reduces all that is said in
the Bible to such assertion, or to "historical fact." It is on such grounds, for
example, that in certain evangelical circles which maintain the propositionalist
view, the account of Noah and the Flood can be read in only one way, as "fact."
For Vanhoozer, such an approach is a reductionism, a reductionism which
impoverishes the dramatic nature of Scripture and doctrine alike —because
God's speaking though Scripture is not simply intended to relate facts, but to
engage humans in relationship. Vanhoozer is not completely removing

18 W.V. Quine, Philosophy of Logic, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 1970.
19 Vanhoozer, The Semantics of Biblical Literature, 63.
20 Vanhoozer, The Semantics of Biblical Literature, 63.
21 Vanhoozer, The Semantics of Biblical Literature, 64.

51

propositions as part of the linguistic aspect of Scripture, but rather insisting on
the idea that propositions are only part of the biblical text rather than the sole
category by which the text is to be classified. The effect, in Vanhoozer's
treatment, is that there should be no separation between the personal and
propositional nature of God's revelation, for in it, "God personally confronts us
by means of the scriptural propositions that He propounds in various ways for
our consideration."22 It is not enough to focus on propositions, because the true
force "which attends to Scriptures meaning," and which engages us personally, is
often lost under the heading of propositional revelation.23 Those who study
speech-act theory will recognize the word "force" in the previous sentence. Force
is an important concept to understand because Vanhoozer develops much of his
argument against propositionalism based upon the recognition that the force and
the propositional content of an utterance are not one and the same thing.
Mitchell Green gives a wonderful summary, and an insightful parallel, in his
explanation of this important concept:
"In chemical parlance, a radical is a group of atoms normally incapable of
independent existence, whereas a functional group is the grouping of those
atoms in a compound that is responsible for certain of the compound's
properties. Analogously, it is often remarked that a proposition is itself
communicatively inert; for instance, merely expressing the proposition
that snow is white is not to make a move in a "language game." Rather,
such moves are only made by putting forth a proposition with an
illocutionary force such as assertion, conjecture, command, etc. The chemical
analogy gains further plausibility from the fact that just as a chemist might
isolate radicals held in common among various compounds, the student of
language may isolate a common element held among 'Is the door shut?',
'Shut the door!', and 'The door is shut.' This common element is the
proposition that the door is shut, queried in the first sentence, commanded

22 Vanhoozer, The Semantics of Biblical Literature, 93.
23 Vanhoozer, The Semantics of Biblical Literature, 93.
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to be made true in the second, and asserted in the third. According to the
chemical analogy, then:
Illocutionary force : propositional content :: functional group : radical
In light of this analogy we may see.. .that just as the grouping of a set of
atoms is not itself another atom or set of atoms, so too the forwarding of a
proposition with a particular illocutionary force is not itself a further
component of propositional content."24
Based on this understanding of force, we can now claim that the force of
the biblical text cannot be attended to through examining the text as proposition
because force is not a category of the proposition. If we are to move from the
bare proposition we need to account what the divine Author was doing and is
doing presently with the text to how he is commanding, promising or
encouraging, in other words to attend to the divine dramatic direction, to the
theo-drama.
The overarching metaphor for Vanhoozer is the theo-drama, God's
entrances and exits, his speech-acts, his definite Word/Act in Jesus Christ. These
are powerful acts that shape what we know about and say about God.
Vanhoozer states that "the model of drama brings into focus the centrality of
communicative action, both human and divine."25 Drama is the right metaphor
for conceiving of what God is doing in the Scriptures because the Scriptures are
recognized as a "script" that reveals God through a series of "communicative
initiatives" which "together recount a single drama of redemption."26 This
drama is good news because it tells us that God is acting and that God is
speaking, and that God is doing so on our behalf and for our salvation.
Humanity is not dependent merely on the faith of men and women or on human
24 Mitchell Green. "Speech Acts", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009), ed. Edward N.
Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr20Q9/entries/speech-acts/ (accessed June 10, 2011).
25 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 35.
26 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 38.
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experience or reason for knowledge of God, since it is the purpose of God to
reconcile humanity to himself, and this through covenantal relationship
mediated to us by Scripture. Any drama that is to conceive of God as more than
"disparate bits of ideas and information," such as is offered by propositionalists
must begin with God's doings, or with the theo-drama.27
This theo-drama is based upon the idea "that God can enter and has
entered into relationship with the w orld."28 God is not bound to any type of
performances other than the ones in which he desires to engage. Since God is
creator and redeemer, all things necessarily depend upon his prior action.
Scripture pictures God as entering into the lives of people and of humanity as a
whole in ways that he decides, and as needed to accomplish his purposes. This is
most clearly seen in the case of the Incarnation, the entrance of God into the
world par excellence! The exits, however, are just as spectacular. Think of the
Exodus, an exit wholly dependent on the initiative of God, one that (partially)
consolidates the promise to Abraham, and that would (according to Christian
conceptuality) find fulfillment in Jesus Christ. There is "dramatic tension built
up over centuries" in the Bible over this promise to Abraham, concerning how
and when the promise would be fulfilled, and this tension finds its release in the
resurrection of Jesus.29 While the resurrection is an exodus, in that it inaugurates
the end of slavery to sin and death, it simultaneously is an entrance into the
promise of a new creation (new life for the children of God), which also coincides
with the gift of the Holy Spirit.
This divine voice must be understood from these divine entrances and
exits as the work, not of a monological entity, but of the trinitarian God in
27 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 39
28 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 40.
29 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 41.
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communicative act. The theo-drama in the Scriptures is the work of three
persons in one, fully God individually and in community. God speaks and acts
as three in one, as the Trinity; the Trinity is his "divine identity."30 According to
Vanhoozer, God's acting and speaking within the Trinity is God's being in
communion. This acting and speaking in communion thus reveals the triune
God. The good news, or the gospel, can be understood as that invitation by
which humans are able to join this acting and speaking through the triune desire
to widen the circle of communion.31
Within drama itself, it has been recognized that dialogue, which often
carries the action, functions by virtue of the fact that saying is a form of doing. In
a play, for instance, dialogue, or even a monologue set in the context of dialogue,
is part of the action. The same idea can be applied to the theo-drama. Of course,
God's voice is very different from any human voice, revealing a being in perfect
communion and with a clear will, purpose and power. God's voice, unlike that
of any other, itself sets the context by which it is to be heard, believed and
obeyed. By his voice the world and his people are created, called, and redeemed.
Recognizing these many works of the voice of God clearly undermines the
"tendency to make divine revelation the overarching category," as Vanhoozer
points out, because God's speech does more than merely "make God known."32
Propositionalists defend the verbal action of God as revelation and thus subsume
all biblical material under the category of revealed propositions. The way
forward, says Vanhoozer, is to recognize that the word of God is something that
God both says and does — that is, to view it dramatically.

30 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 43.
31 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 43.
32 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 45.
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The Biblical Text as the Words of God
To understand the word of God dramatically is to understand it as an
instance of God in communicative act. To make the claim that God is in
communicative action in the Scriptures, however, entails an account of the
relationship of human words to the divine word, and how the human words of
the Bible may legitimately be said to be God's words. The central concept used
to understand the relationship between divine and human speech in this context
is, of course, "revelation." For Vanhoozer, Scripture is not less than revelation,
but more interestingly, it is also more than just revelation because revelation is
located, as he puts it, within the broader "economy o f the gospel."33 The point of
this is that the Scriptures are not the end in themselves; rather, Christ, his person,
and his actions are what the Scriptures bear witness to, and it is to him that they
direct us. Therefore, the Scriptures are, in Vanhoozer's treatment, the "(divinely)
authorized version of the gospel" which "articulates the Word of God: Jesus
Christ."34 This concept of authorization is very important in Vanhoozer's
account, as it is the hinge upon which turns the claim that the Bible can be seen as
the actual words of God. Vanhoozer says that his conception of authorization
depends to a great extent on Nicholas Wolterstorff's argument for authorization
in Divine Discourse. In this book, Wolterstorff shows, through the concept of
authorization and double discourse, how it is that a God without vocal chords to
speak or hands to write could be said nevertheless to speak or inscribe. I will turn
to Wolterstorff's argument shortly, but for the present, we need to note that in an
early essay, "The Semantics of Biblical Literature," Vanhoozer writes that
"Scripture itself is a collection of divine speech acts, which have been inscribed
by human authors," leaving us to wonder if he means inspired dictation or some

33 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 45.
34 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 46.
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other means of the text being God's own words.35 While the obvious need is to
say more than simply that, "God said and humans inscribed," in fact
Vanhoozer's position at this point is disappointing, as it relies exclusively upon
Wolterstorff. For all his intellectual athleticism, Vanhoozer himself does not
deepen our understanding any further at this point, despite the fact that the case
for the inscribed communicative acts of God is essential to the argument.
Vanhoozer merely states, "I propose to take such a view [Wolterstorff's proposal
about dual-author discourse] as a given...."36
I would like to suggest that mentioning Wolterstorff's work is clearly not
enough. Discovering the intention of God in the Bible means that the text must
be regarded as the actual speech of God, yet this is not a self-evidently rational
claim since God did not write the biblical text himself. I will therefore attempt to
make this much needed clarification of Wolterstorff's theory of dual-author
discourse over the next few pages, before continuing on with Vanhoozer's
understanding of God as Author in communicative act.
Like Vanhoozer, Wolterstorff holds that divine discourse, or the
illocutionary acts (communicative acts) of God, are more than revelation. Neither
Vanhoozer nor Wolterstorff believe that the picture of God as speaking to be
purely metaphorical. When God speaks, God is literally involved in speaking.
But how is it that the poets', prophets', and apostles' words written by them in
the Bible can become the medium of divine speech? Is there an analogy in
modern day practice that can clarify for us how this might be possible? Does the
practice happen in human interactions regularly, so that we might have some
comparison by which to bring to light what God is doing when he is said to be

35 Vanhoozer, The Semantics of Biblical Literature, 93.
36 Vanhoozer, First Theology, 194.
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speaking, regardless of the fact that humans are the ones doing the writing or
saying?
To go deeper into this notion, Wolterstorff provides some everyday
examples of how it is possible for people to speak without uttering or inscribing
the words themselves. If Wolterstorff is unable to show that God could similarly
speak particularly and literally through people, then the distinction between
speech as metaphor, speech as revelation, and speech as act would be undone,
and Vanhoozer's whole project directed at reorienting theology to the real and
actual, communicative acts of God would also be undone! But if Wolterstorff
shows that God can say specific, literal things, and do so intentionally, then we
can continue on with Vanhoozer's defence of the dramatic nature of revelation,
and of the idea that God says and does something in the Scripture, by engaging
in divine communicative acts. To state this part of the problem more clearly,
Wolterstorff needs to show that a God without vocal chords or hands can say and
write particular things of a non-natural, non-manifestational variety. The
medium of discourse that Wolterstorff focuses on is the written word. He looks
at how written words, words written by one person, can really be the words of
another. Wolterstorff calls this action, that of attributing the writing of one
person as the medium of another saying something, "double agency discourse."37
One of Wolterstorff's examples of double agency discourse is shown in the
relationship of secretaries and executives in their mutual production of texts.
What is special about texts produced by a secretary (scribe, amanuensis) is that
though the executive may dictate the full content of the document and then sign
the document, in practice and in principle the text does not have to be produced

37 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 38.
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in this way.38 It may also be the case that the secretary is told "the substance of
what she (the executive) wants to say and leaves it to the secretary to find the
appropriate words," and then that the executive signs the document as drawn up
by another.39 It matters not who the secretary is, what he believes, if he agrees or
disagrees with what he is writing. The only thing that matters is that once the
text is produced by the secretary it is accepted as the "medium" of the executive's
"saying something."40 Wolterstorff then goes on to think through the possibilities
and limits of the relationship of secretary and executive or agent. After all, one
would think that there must be some boundary as to how far distant the agent
can be from the production of the text in this relationship, in order for the text
still to be regarded as her own. One would think that some level of
superintendence must be observed in order for such a text to be accepted as one's
saying something. The question is what level of superintendence?
Sometimes, for instance, the agent supplies the gist of what she wants the
secretary to say and then allows him to organize the information supplied in a
way that reflects his secretarial voice. The agent will not begrudge the
individuality of style that the secretary displays, which may well, after all, be
superior in literary terms or in exactness compared to what the agent might have
produced. In fact, it may be the particular style or skills of the secretary to
produce such texts that was the reason the agent chose him in the first place. The
relationship of secretary and agent producing texts together is often stretched
even farther than this. Sometimes the agent is unavailable to offer specific
guidance concerning the content of the text she wants written. In such cases, it is
often the intent of the agent that texts and letters should still be written, even

38 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 38.
39 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 39; emphasis added.
40 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 38.
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when the agent is removed from the situation. The important fact is that she has
left the secretary with the intent of having him send out correspondence and
produce texts in her absence. So it is that, according to Wolterstorff, 'Without the
executive even doing so much as communicating to the secretary the substance of
what she wants to say, the secretary may know what the executive wants to say
to one and another person, and composes letters accordingly. The crucial thing is
that the secretary "know the mind" of his superior/41
Can we take this a step further? Could the secretary sign documents on
behalf of the agent? At first someone might perhaps doubt this possibility, but in
fact it happens all the time. An agent may dictate what she wants said and the
secretary prepares and then signs the document for her. Such secretaries, when
producing texts, are not saying something themselves. If an executive of a
company for which I worked sent me a letter, written by her secretary, that said
that I had been fired, and proceeded in derogatory language falsely to describe
my shortfalls, I could scarcely go to the secretary and question why he had said
such harsh things to me. His response to me would be that he was not the one
who had said those things. I could not rightly incriminate him in saying such
falsehoods. The secretary is innocent in the things said because he did not say
them. There are not two illocutionary acts, so that it is not that "one person [is]
performing an illocutionary act by way of another person performing an
illocutionary act."42 There are not two speech acts occurring in this case, but only
one — the executive's illocutionary act. Even if it is the case that the secretary in
my example writes the letter that will fire me and is then authorized to sign it for
the executive, it is still taken as the executive's letter.

41 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 39.
42 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 40.
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What Wolterstorff is trying to clarify through this analysis of the ordinary
work of secretaries and executives is two different phenomena of variations in
"degree and mode of superintendence."43 On this continuum we find cases
where the discourser herself produces the text, to the opposite extreme where the
degree of supervision by discourser over inscriber is effectively nil. To
understand how distant this relationship of inscriber and illocutionary act can be,
I could think of no better illustrations than Wolterstorff's. Imagine, he says, that,
'One comes across an interesting "fortune" in a fortune cookie, glues it on a piece
of stationery, adds one's signature, and sends the whole thing off to a friend.
One finds a witty birthday card in a shop, signs it, and sends it off.'44 In both
these cases, an unknown person wrote the fortune or birthday sentiment. The
one who sends the card off duly signed, for his or her part, had nothing to do
with the production of the text at all. In fact the writer might have thought that
what he or she wrote was sappy, or may have written the warm words of
congratulation in a fit of anger. But the emotional content or intention of the
inscriber does not matter in the least to the illocutionary speech act of the person
who bought the card, and then sent it to another as a way of saying something.
This is an example of the second phenomenon Wolterstorff calls,
"authorization."45
Authorization occurs when the discourser authorizes a text so that the text
counts as his illocutionary act; the text thus becomes the "medium" of his
speaking. Authorizing in fact underlies all discourse. We need not look for such
formal actions as we have mentioned, actions such as signing or declaring the
medium as authorized, for instances of authorization. Think of speaking

43 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 41.
44 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 41.
45 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 41.
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(dialogue). As Wolterstorff says, in the case of speaking, "authorization resides
in our participating in a situation of utterings counting as speaking."46 What is
important for authorization is not that individuals produce the texts in question,
but that they have the power to bring it about that the text be taken as their text.
Wolterstorff has a particular name for discourse that has been authorized. He
calls it "deputized discourse."47
Up to now, it has been difficult to see quite what Wolterstorff has been up
to, and how it might relate to Vanhoozer's theological concerns. How are these
many examples valuable in revealing how God could speak in light of his lack of
physical apparatus pertaining to speech? It is in connection with the idea of
deputized discourse that some of the answers to this question are concretely
discussed. Wolterstorff says that, "This phenomenon, of speaking in the name of,
is of central importance in the cases of God's speech."48
The example of deputized discourse that he begins with is that of an
Ambassador speaking in the name of a head of state. Wolterstorff points out that
it is the expected practice that the words of the Ambassador will be taken as the
words of the head of state. But clearly, not everything that the Ambassador says
can be taken this way. The deputation "...will always have a more or less limited
scope; only if the ambassador's speech falls within that scope will he be speaking
in the name of his head of state."49 If the Ambassador were to say, "All trade
deals are suspended until further notice," he would be speaking in the name of
his head of state. On the other hand, if he were to observe, "Soccer is a great
sport!" he would presumably be speaking only for himself and conversationally.

46 Wolterstorff,
47 Wolterstorff,
48 Wolterstorff,
49 Wolterstorff,
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As a deputized discourses an Ambassador thus speaks in the name of the
head of state, but not in such a way that the head of state oversees every word
that the Ambassador utters.50 This is why choosing an Ambassador is such an
important task. An Ambassador will formulate the intentions of the head of state
in his or her own way. An Ambassador is given the conditions and parameters
for making certain statements, rather than particular words. The Ambassador
then chooses the words that will best accomplish the intention of the head of
state, so as to formulate a position to the greatest advantage.
The concept (to which reference has already been made) that underlies the
practice of Ambassadors is that one can "speak in the name of." Indeed, the
whole position rests on this assumption. What makes this different from the
example of the secretary is that with the Ambassador, a form of double speaking
is possible, whereas with secretaries it is not. When the Ambassador is speaking,
performing locutions, it is possible that two illocutionary acts are occurring at the
same time. The illocutionary act can first of all be the Ambassador saying
something, but alongside this can be found an illocutionary act of the head of
state. These two illocutionary acts are in constant flux. In one dialogue the
Ambassador may be speaking for himself, at another time in the name of the
head of state, and on other occasions for both.51
From this example of the ambassador we move finally to some biblical
examples. Wolterstorff says that biblical prophecy, for instance as recorded for
us in the prophetic books of the Old Testament, regularly moves back and forth
in just this way between the prophet speaking in the name of God, by virtue of
having been deputized to do so, with the prophet speaking in his own voice but

50 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 44.
51 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 45.
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delivering a message from God, and the prophet speaking in his own voice and
not delivering a message from God.52 Wolterstorff cites Hosea 9:11-17 in this
connection:
"Ephraim's glory shall fly away like a bird - no birth, no pregnancy, no
conception! Even if they bring up children, I will bereave them until no
one is left. Woe to them indeed when I depart from them!...Give them, O
Lord - what will you give? Give them a miscarrying womb and dry
breasts. Every evil of theirs began at Gilgal; there I came to hate them.
Because of the wickedness of their deeds I will drive them out of my
house. I will love them no more; all their officials are rebels. Ephraim is
stricken, their root is dried up, they shall bear no fruit. Even though they
give birth, I will kill the cherished offspring of their womb. Because they
have not listen to him, my God will reject them .. ,"53
In this passage there is an "I" referenced. Who is the "I," Wolterstorff asks, who
is spoken about? It is God. And yet these are not God's words quoted, according
to Wolterstorff, but Hosea's words. The point is that God has told Hosea to say
these words. God has said something to Hosea and then Hosea, in a speech act,
and as deputized by God, speaks to the people these words of God. God by way
of commissioning Hosea as deputy is in this sense saying the very same thing as
his chosen deputy.54
In this same passage of the Old Testament, however, there are also words
that are clearly Hosea's own, in the sense that the words are in the voice of
Hosea. "Give them, O Lord - what will you give? Give them a miscarrying
womb and dry breasts."55 These words are not God saying something to Hosea,
and then Hosea saying them to the people as deputy, but Hosea speaking on his
own. We also find at times that Hosea is speaking in his own voice, but that God

52 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 45-46.
53 Hosea 9:11-17 (NRSV)
54 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 46.
55 Hosea 9:6-8 (NRSV)
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is also involved in the illocutionary act. There are many examples in the Old
Testament of this kind of dizzying array of possibilities and examples of what
Wolterstorff calls the "interplay of superintendence and authorization."56
Hence, on such terms a prophet in biblical terms can be understood as one
involved in a form of deputized discourse — one who has been raised up, and
deputized by God to say things of a certain sort when speaking in the role of
prophet. Because of the multiple possibilities in discourse, great skill is required
to discern who is saying what, to whom, and when they are saying it.
The New Testament carries forward this idea of the prophetic office into
its account of Jesus. Jesus speaks in the name of God, and his speaking is taken
in the New Testament as God speaking. But does this, in turn, carry forward into
the writings of the Apostles? According to W olterstorff, it does not appear that
the words of God are clearly connected to those of the Apostles by way of
deputation.57 And then there is the case of Paul, who never sees himself as
deputized to speak in the name of God.58 Some have argued that because the
New Testament authors (whether apostles of someone else) never claimed that
their writing or speaking was prophetic, their work cannot be considered to be
authentic divine discourse. Wolterstorff answers this challenge by saying merely
that, "a text need not be the residue of prophetic discourse to be an instrument of
God's discourse."59 Some have tried to get around the problem by arguing in
favour of claim that the apostles were indeed prophets, and further, that the
apostles had direct superintendence over the writing of the letters and other New
Testament documents commonly ascribed to them. But even if we were able to
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make a case for such prophetic discourse in the case of the New Testament,
which might "solve" the issue of those documents, what about the numerous
other books of the Bible that cannot obviously be contrived to be "prophetic
discourse?"60 For instance, in the Psalms we typically find a human being
addressing God. Can these be seen as God saying something? In fact,
Wolterstorff says that they can be regarded as such, but to defend this claim
requires yet another category of discourse.
Wolterstorff delineates this next category using some more examples. For
instance, when one seconds a motion in parliamentary or committee procedure,
one is not only appropriating the text, the locution of the motion, but also the
illocution, the intention, or the force of the discourse in question. Because this
text, with which one has substantial agreement, originates in another, one
chooses to appropriate "the discourse of that other person."61 Yet one cannot put
just any "spin" one wants upon the text, or the discourse that is thus
appropriated. As Wolterstorff puts it, "One's own discourse is a function of that
other person's discourse. What the second person says is determined, in good
measure, by what the first person said."62 This appropriation of discourse retains
the main thrust of the words originally used (even though at times one may
disagree with some of them).
The position outlined, in Wolterstorff's treatment, becomes the vehicle by
it is claimed that the Bible in all cases, in its entirety, is divine discourse. It does
not matter, from the standpoint of appropriated discourse, whether the book has
a "prophetic residue" or not.63 Each book, in its entirety in the canon, has been
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appropriated as God's own (through the institutions of Judaism and of the
church), and therefore it is truly acceptable to recognize it as the "one book of
God."64 There are of course many types of language usage in the Bible, some
parts being deputized discourse for instance, but in all cases the whole will have
the quality of being "appropriated" divine discourse.
To return to the question of Vanhoozer's use of Wolterstorff, and to the
coherence of the claim that God can speak despite lacking the physical structures
required for uttering and inscribing, it would appear to be possible that God can
indeed speak, and that there are in fact many modes in which God can speak
without actually uttering or inscribing words. The Bible, through these methods
of double discourse and authorization, which Vanhoozer accepts, can on these
terms be spoken of as the authorized word of God. It contains and is good news,
not simply because it is received as such in a community, but because it
originates with the divine Author, even though it is inscribed by humans.
Even theologians who hold a high view of the Bible as Scripture have
come to very different conclusions as to what precisely the Bible is. Is it an
authorized version of God's speech, or is it an account of his acts? The biblical
theology movement of the middle decades of the last century came to the
conclusion that "the Bible is not the Word of God [God speaking] but the record
of the Acts of G od.. .,"65 In order to combat separating God from his acts, in
short, some have said that God reveals not by words but by action, by "mighty
acts."66 The trouble is, however, that what is missing in this "mighty acts"
account of the matter is that speaking is one of the things that God does. God
speaks in and through human words, not to reveal (in Vanhoozer's account as in
64 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 53.
65 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 46.
66 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 46.
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Wolterstorff's), although this is undoubtedly a side effect of God's action, but to
promise, to command, to judge, to instruct, to do a range of things not adequately
comprehended by the term "revelation." If the "biblical theologians" were to
look at what God does, they would find that he not only reveals, but that he
creates, for instance, and that he speaks: "through the Word, through the words
of the Word, through the words of others to whom God's word has come (e.g.
Prophets, apostles).. .speaking is one of God's mighty acts."67 Scripture is, by
implication, the premier "ingredient in the economy of divine communicative
action."68
The claim that God's speech is also his action gives Vanhoozer the tool he
needs to get beyond the "propositional" and "personal" revelation impasse that
had been his goal since the early article with which we began this aside.69 Speech
acts are both propositional because they have content and personal because the
speaker is doing something with the propositional content that involves the
hearer, so that the content does not stand on its own. The statement points back
to the illustration in chapter one of the stones washed up on the beach that says
"no smoking." There is no meaning, no "personal" meaning, unless it was
created by someone, for someone. Positively, propositional content means
something, or has meaning, because someone has said it, to someone else.
Thus Vanhoozer attempts to move beyond the impasse of personal and
propositional, but this move requires a deeper explanation of God in
communicative action. He accomplishes this by what he calls, "reclaiming the
scripture principle."70 The scripture principle "maintains that the Bible itself is
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ultimately a species of divine discourse/' a principle which goes back right to the
beginnings of the New Testament. The theological model that Vanhoozer is
building does not require that one choose between personal and propositional
revelation, as is commonly the case in modern theologies of revelation, but
extends beyond both of them. Vanhoozer's model is postpropositional, as has
been said, but it does not do away with either personal or propositional
revelation. The appeal is to the 20th century's concept of the speech-act, and the
argument proceeds by way of the idea of illocution, the name given to the
recognition that we do something in speaking.71 For instance, when a minister
says, "I pronounce you man and wife," words are not merely uttered, but
something changes in the legal and moral sense; by saying the words, the
minister makes it so.
Vanhoozer examines the concept of promise in the context, in order to
show how the Bible is not simply a source of information but speech-act. A
promise is not what it is because of some information shared, but because the
agent who makes the promise commits himself or herself to a course of future
action. Promising is doing something (committing oneself) by saying something.
What make the promise such a good example of a speech-act in connection with
our understanding of the Bible is that God makes many promises in the Bible,
committing himself to future action. The cross is also a powerful communicative
act, a "deed-word," as Vanhoozer puts it.72 God is not just communicating
"information about salvation — not simply propositions — but the promise,
assurance, and the requirements of salvation."73 These speech-acts are the way
that God engages humanity in personal relationship. If God did not involve

71 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 63.
72 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 66.
73 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 66.
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himself in such speech-acts, we would possess simply information which would
have very little if any effect on us. But God does speak, and he does so to
"communicate a share in the triune life."74 We make a mistake when we read the
Bible as a document to be studied, rather than as God addressing us. God
intends for us to hear the words He speaks as initiating a dialogue, a relationship,
a "covenantal situation" where both the speaker and hearer "assume certain
obligations in the process of communicating."75
The move that Vanhoozer makes thus goes beyond the propositional and
personal, and takes us to covenantal relationship. It is by responding
appropriately to the different illocutions of God (as found in the Bible) that we
discover how we are to be in relationship with God. By "believing its (the
Bible's) assertions, by trusting its promises, by obeying its commands, by singing
its songs.. .we becom e.. .covenantally related to Christ."76 This leads Vanhoozer
to say that Scripture, since it is one of the means that puts us into covenantal
relationship with Christ, is also the means for our transformation.77
Vanhoozer is clearly not attempting to abolish propositions so much as
"propositionalism," the theological theory beloved of many an evangelical, who
makes propositions the category under which all biblical material falls.
Vanhoozer, by contrast, seeks to put propositions into their right place, as the
content of a communicative act, and thus as the basic material out of which can
come something more important, which is a relational or covenantal theology. It
is not, therefore, that propositions do not matter; but propositions are important
because our faith relies on hearing something specific, something, for instance,
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about Jesus Christ, about his relationship to God, and about what he has done for
us in his death and resurrection.78
The Bible, then, from Vanhoozer's perspective, is a covenantal
communicative act which engages those to whom it is addressed. The Scriptures
look very different when we view them, "not as a set of propositional truths," but
as mediating a way of life in Jesus Christ. Yet the Bible should not only be
viewed as divine discourse in the particulars, since the Bible must also first of all
be viewed as divine discourse in general at the level of the canonical.79 Some
influential post-liberal theologians, such as George Lindbeck, as we have seen,
have treated communal ecclesial practice as setting the norm of Christian life.
But as Kathryn Tanner has pointed out, "Appeal to communal norms will not
guarantee.. .as postliberals want it to, stability underneath the changing forms of
history."80 The changing practices that Christians either have picked up, or may
pick up along the way, need to be tested against something that is complete and
authoritative. This is accomplished through the clarification of the canon.81
Vanhoozer states that canonicity is important because the oldest temptation in
Christianity is to claim that, "God says so," and since many people make such
claims, the question remains, "Whose 'say so' speaks for God?"82
But only God can speak for God. Divine authority ultimately belongs to
God alone, and since "the canon is the locus of God's communicative action," it
is, and must continue to be, definitive for the church.83 Critics of a definitive list
of books as authoritative for Christian life say that having such a list "exacerbates

78 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 89.

79 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 121.
80 Kathryn Tanner, Theories of Culture (Minneapolis; Fortress Press, 1997), 141.

81 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 122.
82 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 122.
83 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 124.
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the problem inasmuch as the canon itself cannot stave off the conflict of
interpretations about its meaning."84 Vanhoozer does not deny the problem of
multiple interpretations, but he insists that cultural-linguistic theologians who
locate authority in the church have no solution to the problem either (as can
readily be seen, for instance, in so much of the American "mainline"). Therefore,
whether to locate authority in the ecclesial community or canon cannot be a
question of which method provides the best interpretation, but is instead a
question of what principle preserves "the integrity of the gospel." That principle
which preserves the integrity of the gospel is the one that considers "authorship
and origin: is the church the author of the gospel, or is the gospel the author of
the church."85 Holding that the words of the Bible are God in communicative act,
therefore, moves us beyond the Bible as mere "handbook of information." The
recognition of the canon, similarly, is a recognition that God has spoken
authoritatively to us. When we hold to the Bible as canon, we receive it as an
authoritative communication of God to humans.86
One important question that Vanhoozer is right to ask in this context is
this: "How do we know that the church continues to preach the same gospel as it
moves into new times and places?"87 Through the many different venues of
language, practices, feelings and experiences, the Bible has been read and
understood differently. How can we be sure that it has not been and will not be
distorted, and that we do not lose touch through such development with its real
centre, Jesus Christ? It is neither enough simply to repeat the past, whether this
be past language or interpretation or doctrine, nor conveniently to dispose of the
past for the sake of present language, interpretation, or doctrine. Tradition,
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according to Vanhoozer, offers a way to "negotiate the tensions between
'sameness' and 'difference/ an attempt that aims at a kind of nonidentical
repetition" or theo-dramatic continuity.88 Being faithful in passing on the Bible
across the changes imposed by time and circumstance requires not rote, literal
tradition, but a "living tradition...that compels the church to reconfigure the past
in light of new developments."89 We can have this living tradition that is faithful
to its past in new cultural contexts when we look to the canon to be both "catalyst
and criterion for 'creative fidelity' and 'ruled spontaneity.'" This interaction with
cultures, languages, and ideas that the church meets in spreading the gospel
requires a "theo-dramatic" improvisation that works both with people, and
(crucially for our purposes), with "a script."90
An excellent example of such creative fidelity, in Vanhoozer's view, comes
from the practice of biblical translation in missionary settings. It is the task of the
Christian missionary engaged in translation not merely to take the Bible's
message and bring it to a new culture, but to do so in such a way that the Bible
becomes cognizant to the culture. This happens through taking the Bible and
translating it into the language of the people. The reason the Bible can be
translated into different languages, however, and yet remain the word of God, is
precisely because the intent of the divine communication can be recovered, and
because the goal of translation, which is one of passing on the content of the
gospel, is to hand on this "divine communicative action, action that makes up the
theo-drama," rather than simply to convey a set of concepts.91 The church need
not speak the same language, but only the illocutionary intent must remain the
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same — that is, the understanding of the intent of the divine Author of Scripture
as communication.
Vanhoozer's explanation of this the recovery of illocutionary intent, using
an example from Lindbeck, bears repeating in its entirety:
Here we may recall Lindbeck's famous example of the Crusader who cries
"Jesus is Lord" as he cleaves an infidel's skull. At first glance, the
Crusader's 'translation' is technically correct; the words "Jesus is Lord"
appear to be an accurate rendering of New Testament texts such as Phil.
2:11. The Crusader's actions, however, communicate something else, and
hence demonstrate his misunderstanding. The Crusader's doctrine led
him to participate in an unfitting manner in the drama of redemption, or
worse, in a different drama altogether, oriented more to the political
power and violence of the city of man than to the law of love that
characterizes the city of God. The Crusader repeats the words, but his
communicative action misfires; he mimics the locutions but fails to
preserve their 'illocutionary force.'92
If the Crusader were to rethink his translation and enactment of them, not as
simple propositional content but rather as divine communication, he might have
realized that the words of the New Testament were incongruous with his actions.
The Bible cannot be read for information only without this resulting in distortion.
The Author of the Scriptures is doing more in each instance than just stating facts
from which we initiate some separate illocutionary force. The words of the
Scriptures when understood as communicative action come already with an
illocutionary force that is determined by the divine speaker, and which we must
grasp when speaking or hearing the same words.
Since none of the words of the canon are just propositional, then even
what seem to be "rules and universal principles" must be subtly reinterpreted as
representing more than mere "information" or "general truths." Vanhoozer's
92 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 133.
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assumption in this context is that the rules and universal principles also serve as
part of the propositional content of the divine communicative act, or as part of
the promise. The coming of Jesus the Messiah, says Vanhoozer, is thus rightly
said not to be based on a "system of law," nor is it in some soteriological manner
a means by which cosmic justice is meted out. Jesus' coming is the result of an
"old covenant" that is based on God entering into personal relationship through
an act of discourse, saying "I promise" to his people at a point in history.93 His
faithfulness to his promise realized in Jesus Christ is not only "God-keeping-hisW ord," but also a promise that itself anticipates further eschatological promises
of grace and mercy. The church depends on the canonical text, because the canon
remembers, embodies and expresses these promises of God to humanity, as well
as the other elements of covenant such as "stories, stipulations, [and] sanctions."94
The canon, as the collection in which the recorded dealings of God with
humanity are found, lays out both God's and humanity's respective roles and
responsibilities, and for this reason, it must be taken to be an authority for us.
Promises, or covenants, in some traditions required a writing down of the
promise for it to be permanently fixed. In ancient tradition, including the biblical
tradition, canon and covenant were therefore tied together. Vanhoozer echoes
this relationship of covenant and canon when he says that, "where there is no
canon, there can be no covenant."95 The canon thus is the written down witness
to how, when, and why God has entered into relationship with humanity. It
gives a clear account of God in communicative action through Israel and Jesus
Christ that binds both the one who promised and the one to whom the promise is
made in a record of promise, or a covenant. Therefore, says Vanhoozer, "the

93 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 136.
94 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 137.
95 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 138.

75

canon, seen in the light of its connection to the covenant, is much more than a
theological slide rule or criterion for true propositions...."96
The Authority of Canon
But can we treat a text as authoritative in the postmodern climate that
does not read texts in themselves, but texts as received by an interpretive
community? Vanhoozer's argument that the text does not find authority merely
in use (which would be to give authority to the interpretive community), but in a
"full-orbed...practice of sola scriptura."97 What those who follow Lindbeck's
cultural-linguistic approach believe is that, "the Bible only becomes canonical
Scripture in the context of the church's practice." This Vanhoozer calls the
codependency thesis, which claims that Scripture cannot function as canon apart
from the church. Of course any claim to an authoritative canon, authoritative in
itself, is going to raise a number of well worn objections such as, "Whose canon?
Which books?"98 Vanhoozer says there have been many studies into
canonization which have made the case for different perspectives. But all the
study matters very little because in fact the Christian church, Orthodox, Roman
Catholic, and Protestant broadly agree on the core of the canon.
Another objection is the critical thesis that the canon, with its implications
of power, authority and control, is an ideological tool. The sheer concept of the
canon on this account "controls meaning by limiting the range of acceptable
interpretations," and therefore exhibits will-to-power.99 Vanhoozer, of course,
not only agrees with the canon's ability to control meaning, but embraces the
prospect of such control as a reminder that "not anything goes." This is not,
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however, an example of ideological control, as the hostile critic would have it
(although, to be sure, some could use it this way), but is rather seen by
Vanhoozer as a means of ecclesial "self-control" that opens conversation with the
rich variety of dialogue found within the Bible's pages.100
One further objection to taking the canon as authoritative is more about
nuance than outright objection. Vanhoozer acknowledges William Abraham's
concern that, in taking the Bible as authoritative canon, many people confuse the
soteriological nature of Scripture with the epistemological question. For
Abraham, like Vanhoozer, the purpose of the biblical canon is not to transmit
knowledge, but to "initiate a person into the life of God."101102 Vanhoozer agrees
with this in so far as some of those who appeal to Scripture are too concerned
with the canon as a sort of deposit of propositional truths. The disagreement
with Abraham, however, is that Vanhoozer does not want to be limited in taking
one criterion over another. The canon for him is both soteriological and
epistemological. Where things go wrong is when one element is taken out of the
equation, or when one is given undue emphasis over the other. The point of the
canon is realized when we understand that the canon is a preserve of divine
speech and action that is the measure of what counts as "apt" Christian
communicative action. Or, to say the same thing differently, what counts is
whether it corresponds to the true, good, and beautiful "in Christ," a criterion
which Vanhoozer calls the "sapiential criterion."™2
So the canon is the authorized set of texts that are both an instance of God
saying and of God doing something by saying, revealing through speech and
redeeming through speech. There can be no redemption, on this view, without
i°o Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 144.
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some verbalization of the process of that redemption, in the sense that we cannot
know what God is doing without some linguistic expression of the redemptive
event in a way that we can understand.
The Canonical-Linguistic Approach
Now that I have examined the importance of the canon for Vanhoozer as
the authoritative text of God's communicative act, I will move on to examine his
attempt to bring the canon and the communicative act under one heading. The
title he gives to his method is the "canonical-linguistic" approach, and he
specifically relates this to the scriptural text. Vanhoozer calls this focus on the
text, in the attempt to hear what God has to say to us in the biblical text, as
"exegetical scientia."m Vanhoozer is clear that while the canonical-linguistic
approach to the text is exegesis, it is also more than just exegesis.
One way to look at the biblical text is as "revealed truths propositions."103104 Vanhoozer, as we have seen, believes this view to fall short of
the mark, specifically because it makes the assertion the sole mode of speech in
the biblical text. The biblical text becomes a monologue, which is just the thing
that Vanhoozer believes impoverishes the text. Theologians, including Thomas
Aquinas as well as a number of the Protestant variety, have made the scientia of
exegesis more about analyzing the propositions of God rather than the
"participating in the life of God."105 Vanhoozer does not demonize these
theologians, but believes that they were simply using the assumptions of their
respective times concerning language, science and truth to understand the
Scriptures. The problem that Vanhoozer has with propositionalism in the end is
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that its view of language and Scripture are "too small."106 A science of text needs
to be broader, allowing different forms of speech to coexist without trying to
reduce them all to "a single coherent conceptual scheme."107 When Scriptural
propositions are taken as isolated statements of truth, the canonical
communicative act is reduced to God not in communication but in a purely
assertive, monological voice.
Vanhoozer appeals, for instance, to Mikhail Bakhtin, a Russian literary
critic who worked to reveal how inappropriate a "'monologic' conception of
theory and truth" really is.108 The monologic conception of theory and truth says
that propositions, independent of the speaker or situation, can be combined into
a system that can be "contained by a single consciousness."109 Although
Bakhtin's position was worked out in literary theory rather than theology proper
(though it has clear theological overtones), it is readily applicable to the Bible. For
the Bible contains diverse textual voices, and the pluralities of voices are arguably - needed in concert to get at religious truth. Vanhoozer, for instance,
points to the famous differences between Paul and James and how they might
converse on the relationship of faith and works, in order to illustrate the point
that he sees Bakhtin as making. In short, the Bible has many voices and they are
all needed. When its internal dialogue is reduced to a monological system, the
truth contained by the dialogue is damaged, if not lost.
According to Vanhoozer, proof-texting may be the most obvious example
of how biblical sentences are put into one mold, and made to say one thing, in a
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way that rides "roughshod over the diverse literary genres of Scripture."110
Using various verses from the Bible, exegetes give "proof" for their positions.
This method de-contextualizes the text and creates a single mode in which
Scripture is read. In Vanhoozer's view, both the proof-texter and the
propositionalist wrongly assume that "language is essentially a matter of
picturing states of affairs"; Vanhoozer's canonical-linguistic model, by contrast,
asserts that language does much more (i.e. in speech acts) than just state the way
things are. While propositionalism treats all biblical verses as if they were the
same type of language, Vanhoozer states that language has "many kinds of
wholes to which the various parts (e.g. the individual sentences) are related."111
The canonical-linguistic method attempts an exegesis of the biblical text
that does justice to the many voices and types of literature contained in the
biblical canon. These many voices and types of literature are a result of the fact
that many different people authored the books of the Bible at different times and
in different places, yet when read in its canonical form, where every author is like
a character within a play, each differently authored section represents the unified
work or communicative action of the divine playwright.112 Vanhoozer is here
again moving beyond propositionalism. He does not think that propositionalism
does justice to what God is saying and doing in Scripture. He turns once again to
Wolterstorff to show how the Scriptures are not simply revelation, but promise
and command, and as such are much more than revealing.
Wolterstorff separates speaking from revealing (an aspect of
propositionalism) by clarifying what revelation is: "Revelation occurs when
ignorance is dispelled - or when something is done which would dispel
110 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 271.
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ignorance if attention and interpretative skills were adequate."113 There are
certain things that can be done with words that are not propositional, however,
and that therefore do not communicate (or reveal) knowledge. There are things
very common to everyday speech that does not communicate propositions, in
fact, they are not bits of communication at all, and these are called "speech-acts."
Under the heading of speech-acts, we can place such things as "asserting,
commanding, promising, and asking."114 Speech-act theory is very important for
W olterstorff's argument against all biblical speech as a species of revelation, and
he depends on speech-act theory for his exploration of divine discourse.
Speech-act theory is concerned with those acts performed in language.
The theory, as we have seen, owes its genesis to J.L. Austin and his work How to
Do Things with Words. To review, Austin divides up the speech act into three
parts, the first of which is the locution, which is the sounds that issue forth, or the
utterance itself. Second, and the most important for Wolterstorff's theory, there
is the illocution, "an act performed in saying something." An illocutionary act is
an act "performed instantaneously in the uttering of the words, by virtue of what
the words are taken to mean in context."115 Third, there is the perlocutionary act,
an act that has its meaning in its effect, such as "persuading, soothing,
condemning."116 Wolterstorff himself makes the connection between divine
discourse itself and the theory of speech-acts. He writes:
Once illocutionary acts are thus distinguished from locutionary acts, then
it immediately occurs to one that though of course such actions as asking,
asserting, commanding, and promising, can be performed by way of
uttering or inscribing sentences they can be performed in many other
113 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 23
114 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 32
115 Richard Briggs, "Speech-Act Theory/' in Dictionary for Theological Interpretation of the Bible, 763.
116 Randolph Tate, Interpreting the Bible: A Handbook of Terms and Methods (Peabody: Hendrickson
Publishers, 2007), 260.
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ways as well.... In short, contemporary speech-action theory opens up the
possibility of a whole new way of thinking about God speaking: perhaps
the attribution of speech to G od ... should be understood as the attribution
to God of illocutionary actions....117
What this theory suggests is that if God makes promises and commands,
and thus engages in speech-acts, then he is performing rather than revealing. It
is, furthermore, in the speech-acts of God that the transcendent opens to us. God
opens relationship not by revealing something about himself or his nature, but by
taking a certain stand toward us, a stand that correlatively has the effect of
making us partners in dialogue.
Along with Wolterstorff, Vanhoozer understands the Scriptures as more
than propositional revelation, and terms his way of classifying Scripture as
"divine communicative action," a term he says is better and broader than
Wolterstorff's "divine discourse." Divine communicative action succeeds where
propositional revelation fails because it "acknowledges a plurality of
communicative practices in Scriptures and for this reason (and this reason only)
resists locating what is...significant about Scripture in revealed propositions
alone."118
What I have shown in this chapter is that Scripture cannot be reduced to
propositions, or its interpretation to propositionalism, without impoverishing its
force.119 Vanhoozer has given us an alternative that does not do away with the
propositions of Scripture, but treats them in the light of the idea of the
illocutionary force that the Author of Scripture intended and intends. This
method he calls the canonical-linguistic method, a method which brings together
the concept of God in communicative act, or of a God who actually speaks, with
117 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 13.
1,8 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 278.
119 See my chapter one for a clarification of "force/'

82

locutions and the force of the locution, or with what speech-act theory generally
calls the illocution. He joins these two things, locutions and force, in such a way,
that the locutions accomplish what they were sent to do: perlocutions. These
divine speech-acts are, furthermore, not conceived by Vanhoozer without
reference to biblical accounts of divine speaking. The records of God's speechacts are held together, in short, in the canon, a core group of recognized books
that give structure and authoritative direction to the theo-drama.
In my next chapter, I will examine how Vanhoozer's theology of God's
communicative acts moves forward into saying things about God's being,
making particular reference to how God's being is not completely inaccessible,
that the subject of theologies study is can be known truly through the
accommodated communicative acts of God.
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Chapter 3 - God as the Author of God's Being

In the first two chapters, I have explored the importance of communicative
action in two of Vanhoozer's major works, The Drama o f Doctrine and Is There A
Meaning in this Text? In neither of these works, however, does Vanhoozer
explicitly lay out for us a distinctively Christian account of God's trinitarian
being, a description of the one who authors. Rather, the Trinity serves at best as
the "transcendental condition"1 of meaningful communication, or "serves both as
an identification of the dramatis personae and as a précis of the drama itself."2 In
these two books, Vanhoozer is, however, laying the groundwork for a wider task
of fleshing out the identity of God. He will attempt to do this, not simply by
repeating doctrinal formulas, but by showing how literary, dramatic, and
philosophical theory can be used to "elaborate the nature of God's
communicative action."3
At the point of writing the third major work with which we will be
concerned in this thesis, Remythologizing Theology, Vanhoozer feels that he has
sufficiently prepared the ground for what he wants to develop in a doctrine of
God so as to clarify the identity of this God who authors. In what follows, I will
examine Vanhoozer's account of the triune God, particularly in relation to the
question of God's communicative act in Scripture. As we will see, Vanhoozer will
employ a metaphor commonly used in communication theory in order to flesh
out the concept of communicative acts in the life of the immanent Trinity as a
basis for the communicative acts of the economic Trinity. That metaphor is one of
communication as dance.
1 Vanhoozer Is There A Meaning in this Text, 456.
2 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 43-44.
3 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, xiii.
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The approach taken is once again heavily concerned with Scripture.
Rooting the investigation in the Scriptures is, of course, in line with the overall
direction of Vanhoozer's theology. He observes many times that we can only
know something of God "because God has first spoken to us," and this in various
ways and through the many people in the books of the Bible, which itself
culminates in the story of "Jesus Christ and his Church."4 To ask who God is,
however, is nevertheless to ask an ontological question, a question of being,
rather than simply a question of biblical exegesis. Among the several interesting
features of Vanhoozer's account is the fact that he holds this move into ontology
to be necessary, and to be necessary for the sake of the understanding of
Scripture itself. Vanhoozer defines ontology within his exploration as involving
"reference to the being of particular things."5 He believes that God's particular
being is revealed by God himself in communicative action. God speaks in and
through the Scriptures, according to Vanhoozer, and by this we know him. We
know that he is the one who is speaking because we have heard his voice, and
through the freedom of God to make himself known to us, we know that it is
God who is speaking.6 In what amounts to a very Barthian argument, Vanhoozer
maintains that if we are going to be able to refer to God's being authentically, we
need to attend to how God presents himself rather than to set up an
independently-conceived model which has nothing to do with God's speech-act,
which we then mistakenly apply to God. As Vanhoozer makes clear in a number
of places, "there are distinctly Christian ways of thinking" that are themselves
established by what God has spoken through "Christ and canon."7 These require

4 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, xiii.
5 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, xv.
6 Kevin Vanhoozer, Discourse on Matter: Hermeneutics and the 'Miracle7 of Understanding.
International Journal of Systematic Theology 7, no. 1 (January 2005): 14.
7 Kevin Vanhoozer, "Pilgrim's Digress: Christian Thinking on and about the Post/ModernWay," in
Christianity and the Postmodern Turn: Six Views, ed. Myron B. Penner (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2005), 82.
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a kind of obedience, so that we subject our thinking to them, and avoid
idolatrously imposing human conceptions upon God.
So, we might ask, if we turn to the Scriptures, and encounter there a God
who speaks, what kind of God does things with words as he does? The answer to
this question in Vanhoozer's theology makes important claims about who God is.
Some theologians, such as Rudolf Bultmann, for instance, think of God's acts as
in principle incompatible with a "scientific account of nature," and thus reject the
claim that we can know God by virtue of the fact that he speaks to us in the
Scriptures in a speech-act.8 Others try to reconcile science and religion more
constructively. Somewhat surprisingly, Vanhoozer looks to what he terms
" mythos" as a positive way of negotiating questions of science and myth in these
debates. His Remythologizing Theology adopts a particular position in relation to
mythos rather than myth — as one might expect when comparing the term to
Bultmann's well-known and much more destructive program of
demythologization. Mythos in Vanhoozer's account refers to "this-worldly rather
than other-worldly events," and is therefore intimately linked to the human
story. Mythos is different than myth because the "form and content of mythos are
integrally linked," whereas for myth, literary form is in principle disposable.9 In
the case of the biblical mythos, the complex dramatic whole renders "not only the
action but also the reality of God" in written form, and thus is the final authority
for right speech about God.10
Right speech about God has not always been seen in such close connection
with the speaking God of the Bible. Theology as well as philosophy has relied on
independently-conceived metaphysical categories to say things about God. But
8 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 4.
9 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 5-6.
10 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 7.
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Vanhoozer wonders if it is possible to base a theology on such separate
metaphysical concepts and structures, which do not take their cues from the
Bible, and still speak truly of the identity of God. If the use of such theological
metaphysics means that humans can think about God without assistance from
God, then on Vanhoozer's account, all that we claim about God will only be
human projection. By simply reasoning about God abstractly, we do not arrive at
true knowledge of divine things. Vanhoozer believes that a theological
metaphysics that does not rely on God's self-presentation represents a false start
for the theologian, and that it corrupts the fabric of Christian thought.11
This does not mean that there is no value in a metaphysical attempt to "lay
bare the ontological and causal joints of reality.. .."12 However, the use of
metaphysics must be carefully controlled. The metaphysical concepts of
philosophers must be reformed along biblical lines to reveal and point to the God
who, while with creation, also stands apart from it. Since God uses the Bible as
the written form of his self presentation, we must in particular attend to it
carefully, and look for what God says - and how he says it - as indicative of
himself.13 Vanhoozer works this out more specifically when he says that "literary
forms of the Bible are forms not only of writing, but also of thinking and naming
G od."14 This gives the biblical canon in its written form a powerful significance
that I would suggest goes farther than anything Vanhoozer had written up to this
point. Through the many ways that God speaks in the Scriptures, he gives
himself to us not only a partner with whom we stand in dialogue, but also
communicates his being. God not only names himself in the direct form used in

11 Vanhoozer,
12 Vanhoozer,
13 Vanhoozer,
14 Vanhoozer,

Remythologizing Theology, 8.
Remythologizing Theology, 9.
Remythologizing Theology, 11.
Remythologizing Theology, 11.
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Exodus 3, but does so also through "the entire length and breadth of the canon."15
This directs us again to the question, who is this God that we say is a
communicative agent through the Scriptures?
Feuerbach, Bultmann and Demythologizing
At first one may wonder if not all theologians have looked to the
Scriptures as the word, the communicative act, of God. Vanhoozer states, "There
is striking unanimity in the testimony of the church fathers with regard to the
Scriptures as the word of G od."16 But while ancient sources have such unanimity,
this is far from the case in modern theology. Twentieth century theologians such
as Rudolf Bultmann approach biblical interpretation with very different
presuppositions. Vanhoozer particularly contrasts his strategy of
remythologizing with Bultmann's program of demythologizing God's acts.
For Bultmann, God is not a being of which we can speak accurately in
worldly concepts or words. Bultmann maintains that, "If 'speaking of God' is
understood as 'speaking about God', then such speaking has no meaning
whatever, for its subject, God, is lost in the very moment it takes place."17 For
Bultmann, in short, all biblical language that purports to say something about
God's acts "objectify God" by using human categories to speak of him. If we
think of the words as having literal reference, then we are deluded into believing
that we are able to "grasp" God. To interpret biblical texts that speak of God's
acts in human terms correctly, therefore, we must, on Bultmann's reasoning,
understand them as mythic, in the sense that they provide a certain
15 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 12.
16 Kevin Vanhoozer, "Imprisoned or Free: Text, Status, and Theological Interpretation in the
Master/Slave Discourse of Philemon," in Reading Scripture with the Church: Toward a Hermeneutic for
Theological Interpretation, eds. A.K.A. Adam, Stephen E. Fowl, Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Francis Watson (Grand
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006), 64.
17 Rudolf Bultmann, Faith and Understanding, ed. Robert W. Funk, trans. Loise Pettibone Smith
(New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 1:53.
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understanding of human existence rather than a true description of otherworldly
realities. Vanhoozer recognizes the point of Bultmann's position:
"Demythologizing is best viewed as a strategy for translating biblical statements
about God into existential statements about human being."18 It is, however, a
flawed strategy, for it cannot lead us on to knowledge of God. If we start with
human being, or start with the idea of being in general, and "seek to include God
as specified by various adjectives or adverbs, we will inevitably fall short of
God's radical otherness,"19 and in fact we will miss God completely. Here again,
Vanhoozer's position owes much to Barth, who wrote that, "jT jh at which men
can divine or construct as well as believe, that which, as an object of human
divining or constructing, is as dialectical as the absolutized idea of uniqueness,
may be anything we like to call it - and we certainly cannot deny that it is
something - but it is not God."20
Vanhoozer's analysis of Bultmann's program of demythologization leads
to the conclusion that Bultmann is inconsistent, in that he stops short of applying
his idea from start to finish. In short, Bultmann remained a man of faith (who
preached regularly, for example), and did not apply the method of
demythologizing finally and decisively to the whole matter of God in Christ. For
this reason, Vanhoozer calls him a "soft demythologizer."21 The "hard
demythologizer" would, by contrast, be the one who took demythologizing to its
complete end, who removed anything of God and believed that all Godattributed language or knowledge was purely this-worldly and merely human. In
Vanhoozer's account, the great representative of this more consistent position is
18 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 15
19 William Placher, The Triune God: An Essay in Postliheral Theology (Louisville, Westminster John
Knox Press, 2007), 33.
20 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics II/l, ed. and trans. G. W. Bromiley, Thomas Torrance, Thomas
Parker (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1957), 449.
21 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 17.

89

Ludwig Feuerbach. Feuerbach, of course, never mentions the word
"demythologizing," but Vanhoozer holds him to be the grandmaster of suspicion
and the demythologizer par excellence. Feuerbach attempts to reveal the secret of
theology, which in his view is that, "theology is really only anthropology, that
the essence of all religion, including Christianity, is the belief in the divinity of
human nature."22Following in Feuerbach's footsteps are a range of his
postmodern successors who have gone yet further than Feuerbach, and who
become suspicious not only of God, but "of hermeneutics itself.... [Ojn this view,
the secret of reading is authoring: what appears to be the creation of an author —
meaning — is actually the invention (projection) of the reader."23 Based on such a
thoroughgoing suspicion, is there any way for us to know the being of God? The
simple answer is no.
If we begin with Feuerbach, then all we find in religion is ourselves. But
we might ask, "Has Feuerbach broken down faith itself or only a particular
theological system?" Vanhoozer believes that what Feuerbach has done is show
the instability not of faith itself but of Schleiermacher's project of locating faith in
feeling, or religious experience. In fact, Feuerbach begins with a similar, if not the
same premise that later Karl Barth and Vanhoozer would both subscribe to, that,
"The divine assuredly is known only by means of the divine - God is known only
to him self."24 If religion is feeling-based, then the claim of religion to know God is
untenable, as Feuerbach demonstrates. But in the hands of theologians who stake
the claim that God chooses to reveal himself both in Christ and through the
Scriptures, this same idea that only God can know God solidifies their belief that
if God had not first spoken we could say nothing of God.
22 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 19.
23 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 20.
24 Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. George Eliot (New York: Harper and
Brothers), 9.
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God's Self-Presentation in the Scriptures
Vanhoozer turns, as we have seen, to Karl Barth for one solution to the
idea that human projection is the real source of religious language or God-talk.
The Barthian view is that God, who is wholly other, and who cannot be
discovered by human means without being reduced to a human projection, must
find a way to us; God himself must initiate revelation and communication for us
to be able to know anything about him. Barth writes,

. .God who according to

His nature cannot be unveiled to [humans] ... makes Himself present, known,
and significant to them as God ... and makes Himself the object of human
contemplation, human experience, human thought, human speech."25 Barth was
highly conscious of the challenge presented to theology by Feuerbach, and says
that, "if we are not to fall into the arms of Feuerbach at the very first step ... we
must think of God as the subject."26 In Vanhoozer's adaptation of this Barthian
theme (which itself follows the general line taken in a variety of post-Barthian
theologies also), this means that we are going to have to turn to God and "accord
priority to God's own self-presentation in theodramatic activity...,"27 for, as he
puts it, "God's being is not, as it were, reconstructed by going back behind the
economic action of God, for God's being is the self-moved, free act of God's selfcommunicative presence in history."28 This concept of the self-presentation of
God moves beyond the limitations of religious feeling, and leaves the description
of God to God himself.
Vanhoozer's attempt to accord priority to God's self presentation is what
he calls remythologizing. This term is tied to the view that, "Only God can make
25 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, 1/1 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1963), 362.
26 Karl Barth, The Gottingen Dogmatics: Instruction in the Christian Religion, Vol. 1 (Grand Rapids, MI
Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1991), 11.
27 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 23.
28 John Webster, introduction to God's Being is in Becoming: The Trinitarian Being
of God in the Theology of Karl Barth by Eberhard Jungel (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 2001), xvii.
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God known," and that, "W e could know nothing of God or his purposes at all if
God were not a speech agent, for only speaking disambiguates behavior.. .."29
Thus it represents a chastened belief in the natural human power to know God,
and yet at the same time a confident conviction in the possibility of the
knowledge of God on the basis of God's speech. Vanhoozer will not fall back into
a theology that assumes a one-to-one correspondence between God's thoughts
and our thoughts, which would be so simplistic as again to succumb to
Feuerbach, but he nevertheless defends the possibility of true theological
discourse. He does so through the idea of remythologizing, in direct contrast to
the demythologizing which denies the whole idea of God as a speech agent, and
on the basis of the claim already explored in earlier chapters that Scripture is
divine discourse.30
Vanhoozer will seek to show how it is that we can move from the divine
communicative agent's self-presentation in Scripture to God himself.
Remythologizing holds that God speaks, and moreover that his speech is the sole
basis of true statements about God's being. His being is revealed by his word, so
much so, in fact, that "there is no prior category for God prior to his self
communication."31 Vanhoozer is clear that the self-communication of God is
found supremely in Jesus Christ as the word of God made flesh, and as such, in
him as the communicating presence of God on earth. But the word of God is also
spoken in a different sense in Scripture.
The Bible is neither simply a projection of human thoughts about God, nor
can it be deemed an equivalent of the enfleshed Word, a sort of a fourth divine
hypostasis, another person of the Godhead. The Bible is best viewed as a
29 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology 24.
30 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 23.
31 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 25.
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secondary communication, but a secondary communication that "not only
transmits information but also, and more importantly, conveys life."32 This means
that the Bible is not revelation in the same way as Christ himself. At the same
time, the Bible is the means by which the voice of God enters onto the "world
stage," where his entrance is initiated by his action. This is action not in the sense
of "motional causality," but speech-action which is self-communication and the
self-revelation of being.33 Remythologizing, then, takes seriously the biblical
depictions of God's speaking, and sees the Scriptures as a species of divine
dialogical action.
For Vanhoozer, then, God through the Scriptures is involved in self
communication, but another way of speaking about self-communication is to
speak of authorship. The concept of God as Author, though specifically
concerned with God and Scripture, also conceptually "covers what God does as
creator, reconciler, redeemer, and perfecter...," since these are the themes of
Scripture; it thus connotes God's being as none other than a being-in
communicative-action.34 Obviously, the idea of God as Author arises analogically
in relation to the basic and primary mode of human communication, which is
speech, and in relation to its derivative in writing. The position developed here is
an adaptation of a traditional one, and like many classical theological accounts of
the matter, it is not naive. In one instance, Vanhoozer observes (in connection
with the idea of God as speaking) that, "While it is a contingent fact about human
beings that we can only act or bring about changes in the world through some
bodily movement, the latter is not a necessary part of the meaning of the

32 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 24.
33 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 25.
34 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 26.
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concept."35 Lips and tongue are thus not required, and the idea of God as in
possession of such bodily parts is rejected. Yet Vanhoozer does rely on the fact of
the verbal communication of the human authors of the Scriptures, who have
actually spoken and written as agents through whom we continue to affirm that
God speaks.
Can God Literally be Said to Speak? God's Word and Metaphor
As we have seen, Vanhoozer seeks to resolve certain of the problems
associated with the idea of the Bible as divine speech, appealing to the theory of
the speech-act. He recognizes in its light the importance of a cluster of ideas: first,
that speaking is a form of action; second, that apart from speech-acts it is often
impossible to tell what an agent is doing or intends; and third, that in this
connection, God "can neither promise nor command nor forgive without
signaling his intention to do so through communicative conventions (e.g.
language) and communicative actions (i.e. discourse)."36 There is, of course, no
direct correspondence between the way that God speaks and the way humans
speak, nor does there need to be in order to ascribe speech to God. Some hold, as
William Alston has pointed out, that "God can be spoken of as literally having
knowledge and intentions, as creating, commanding, and forgiving, only if those
terms are literally true of God in the same senses as those in which they are
literally true of human beings."37 Such a crude view, however, would
dramatically limit the freedom of God to speak, for on such terms God's speech is
made very like ours. Alston accordingly goes on to defend a more differentiated
position. It is possible to revise human action predicates and apply them to God
without changing their "simple" nature, so long as we recognize the limitation
35 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 58.
36 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 59.
37 William P. Alston, "Can We Speak Literally of God," Divine Nature and Human Language: Essays in
Philosophical Theology (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 45.
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implicit in such analogical thinking. Vanhoozer likewise limits the
correspondence between God's speech and human speech because he believes
that "there is a true but only partial, appropriate but only approximate
correspondence between divine and human speaking."38 An element of
anthropomorphism is thus recognized, but this qualification of the
correspondence between human speech and Divine speech does not invalidate
our ascribing speech to God, nor does it lessen the importance of ascribing
communicative agency to God. In fact, the avoidance of an overly simplistic
account has the effect of strengthening the claim made.
We may be tempted to see the predication of speech to God as a perfect
example of the "Feuerbachian slip" of human projection: God is thus made in our
image.39 But this is to demonize anthropomorphism, forgetting that
anthropomorphism is merely a "species of the genus metaphor."40 Paul Ricoeur
observes, "Metaphor belongs to the language game which governs naming. Thus
we read in Aristotle's Poetics that a metaphor is 'the application to a thing of a
name that belongs to something else, the transference taking place from genus to
species, from species to genus, from species to species, or proportionally.'"41
Metaphors, in the case of the Bible, may accordingly make absurd claims when
read on one level ("M y God is a rock"), but such assertions are to be understood
as a way of making "real discoveries" concerning God. What is needed,
therefore, is an acknowledgment that metaphors concerning God's voice and
speech as found in the Bible represent an "imaginative literalism," one that seeks
to understand the "is" and "is not" nature of metaphor. The challenge is

38 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 58.
39 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 61.
40 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 61.
41 Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth TX.: Texas
Christian University Press, 1976), 47.
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therefore to discover what should be included in the "is" of the metaphor, and
what is the "vehicle" by which it is communicated.42
Vanhoozer, likewise, is concerned about the "extent that one's view of
anthropomorphism prevents one from seeing God as in some real sense a
personal speech agent, [the fear of which] eviscerates what the Bible is primarily
about: the words and deeds of the triune God."43 Where some may want simply
true or false statements in the Scriptures (propositions), an awareness of the
richness and depth of biblical metaphor opens us to learn about God more
profoundly. The reason why metaphor is discounted is that it does not fit into the
propositionalist methodology. Metaphor, in short, allows for "partial description
(A is like this in some respects and not like this in other respects)."44 For
Vanhoozer, however, the metaphorical character of much of Scripture is patent,
so that we must simply acknowledge how biblical representations of God allow
for "poetic license."
Nevertheless, there is an important qualification. Vanhoozer wonders if
the term "anthropomorphism" is adequate for the scriptural metaphors for God.
If God is the Author of creation, and we are made in God's image, then humans
are in the order of being "theomorphic."45 To give some concrete examples,
divine love, and the divine concern for justice and mercy of which the Bible
speaks, are not properly to be understood as human words imposed upon God
so much as indicators that God has imprinted in the finite creature what is
already preexistent and perfect in him. Thus space is made in the account for a
theology of creation, faith in which in fact itself recognizes God's status as
42 Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor: The Creation of Meaning in Language (Taylor & Francis, 2003),
<http://lib.myilibrary.com.proxyl.lib.uwo.ca:2048?ID=7295> (accessed March 30, 2011), 26.
43 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 62.
44 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 63.
45 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 64.
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Author. To question God's "authoring" of creation, indeed, is to bring into
question everything else that God does or says in the Bible, in which God, in
communicative agency, speaks, interacts, and authors as Lord of the Word.46 Not
all talk of God, therefore, is merely anthropomorphic. When we refer to the Bible
and the categories that God has ordained there, we are in the territory of God's
self-witness and action rather than purely in a world of human words and works.
Jesus Christ, indeed, as spoken of in the New Testament, is the one who "both
ratifies and corrects all previous anthropomorphism," because in this case God
himself becomes a human being rather than simply "like a human being."47 It is,
therefore, possible for God to be expressed in the medium of creaturely life. On
this foundation rests everything that is and can be said in Christian theology.
Divine Speech and Theo-ontology
We are now at the point where we can make the transition from biblical
depiction to the question of theo-ontology, in an effort to show how knowing
something of the being of God is possible in Vanhoozer's theory of God as
speech-agent.48 What the biblical narrative as God's speech provides us with, in
Vanhoozer's theology, is the means by which God as Author makes his self
presentation. What are at base human words are thus elevated by God to be
divine discourse.49
As Vanhoozer brings his idea of God as Author into focus, we find that the
"slip" of Feuerbach looms large. For Feuerbach has not left us but has insinuated
himself into varieties of contemporary thought, particularly philosophy, such

46 Vanhoozer,
47 Vanhoozer,
48 Vanhoozer,
49 Vanhoozer,
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Remythologizing Theology, 78.
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that "anthropology is now the secret not only of theology but of metaphysics."50
The concept of the "human gaze" in particular has had a major influence.
Vanhoozer's rehabilitation of the author is perhaps a partial response to this
question, but the fundamental move that he makes is to turn, not to further
human schemas, as these too have been shown to be unable to stand against
Feuerbach, but to "those prior divine invocations by which the word of God
bespoke creation, led Israel out of Egypt, and became flesh in Jesus Christ,"51 and
which are "instantiated by the various books that render God's word."52 Again, a
broadly Barthian influence upon the argument is unmistakable.
There have been many attempts made in the Christian tradition to
understand God without explicit reference to biblical depictions of God, and
especially to those that have a trinitarian form. Classical theism is frequently
criticized as so affected by Greek philosophy as to render its account of God "an
absolute abstraction that bears little resemblance to the biblical story of a God
who is deeply engaged in the history of his people."53 Vanhoozer believes that
some clarification of the connection between biblical representations of God and
the philosophical concept of Being is required, because of the impact of the latter
on the former.54 His criticism of classical theism's concept of the being of God is
simply that, in it, the relation of God to the world is such that he is never affected
by the world and its actions. Classical theism believes that God stands separate
and apart from creation rather than with it. Some critics maintain that its
hierarchical character has engendered many types of oppression. Vanhoozer's

50 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 181.
51 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 182.
52 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 183.
53 Juan Luis Segundo, Our Idea of God (Maryknoll NY: Orbis Books, 1974), 178-179, quoted in
Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, Remythologizing Theology: Divine Action, Passion, and Authorship,
(NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 84.
54 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 86.
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view in the end is that the witness of Scripture does not reveal such a God but
rather a God of relatedness.55 This claim, of course, is something of a
commonplace, as even the biblical theology movement a generation ago "claimed
that Greek thought imposed an unbiblical philosophy onto scriptural
language."56 But Vanhoozer also wishes to moderate the bluntness of this now
standard judgment. What looks to be a Greek basis for the Christian
understanding of God is actually the product of a "missionary theology" that
made the gospel understandable to early Hellenistic people. Throughout history
Christians have wanted to make their message understood, and so classical
theism might be better called the "Christianization of philosophy," rather than
the converse.57
Modern philosophical theology, on the other hand, frequently criticizes
use of the category of Being in talk about God under the Heideggerian heading of
"ontotheology."58 Vanhoozer largely agrees, arguing in this context that
Descartes, the preeminent modern, differed from classical theism because the
deity he espoused was not the triune God of the canon. The triune God of the
canon has a particular "theodramatic" history with his people, whereas
Descartes' God is not particular in any way; he has no history, no story, but
rather is merely the "perfect generic deity."59 Descartes' God is formed from
metaphysical speculation, and arrived at as the "necessary 'explanation' for the
whole system of beings."60 This has got the logic of theology backwards, since
human speculation flowing out to conceive of God is open to Feuerbach's
55 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 89.
56 Vanhoozer, "The Semantics of Biblical Literature," 54.
57 The influence of Andrew Walls, Vanhoozer's former colleague in Edinburgh, is likely at this
point. See Andrew F. Walls, The Cross-Cultural Process in Christian History (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books,

2002).
58 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 94.
59 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 97.
60 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 99.
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criticism that our thoughts about God only reflect our ideas of perfection, being,
and so forth. If the flow is turned, though, and if instead of trying to master
being, we hearken to the God of the Bible, who through his self-presentation
offers himself to us, then we have a different representation of divine being.
Here, as Vanhoozer sees things, the tools of metaphysics can find new use, as
they are employed "in a non-totalizing manner in order to clarify the divine
ontology implied by the words and acts of the triune God."61 Vanhoozer offers,
instead of ontotheology, a "theo-ontology" that returns to the canon, while
metaphysics is given the role of elaborating on the canonical self-presentation of
God.
What we find in these biblical books is a God who speaks and acts. As
with humans, it is through these that we are able infer something of the identity
of God. So then, the question again becomes, "Who must God be (i.e., what kind
of person) in order to do what Scripture says he does?"62This is a question that is
asked of Jesus in the Scriptures. In Mark's account, when Jesus rebukes the winds
and waters, when he tells them to be still, the question is asked, "Who then is
this, that even the wind and sea obey him ?"63 Who could do such divine things?
Vanhoozer applies a biblical metaphysics to this same general question, in that he
extrapolates from God's act in speaking to God's being. He believes that by
beginning in this way with the "sayings and doings" of God, we can arrive at a
genuine theo-ontology.64 While God's being per se must not be conflated with his

61 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 104.
62 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 187.
63 Mark 4:41(NRSV)
64 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 184
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saying and doing, nevertheless his communicative acts do correctly identify him,
and provide unique categories for understanding his being.65
It is, however, not difficult to find in Scripture that God does not always
speak in one way. Within the Bible itself, God speaks in many different ways
(Heb. 1:1), and the different ways in which he speaks are as essential to what is
communicated as are the story and events themselves. One of the ways in which
God speaks is through "indirect communication."66 Vanhoozer turns to
Kierkegaard to help illustrate this important concept. Indirect communication
refers to showing rather than telling. Christianity has often got it wrong by
focusing on the differences in theological systems or in beliefs rather than by
concentrating on its differing practices, or enactments of those beliefs. This
reflects blindness to one important aspect of God's communication. In the
communication of the divine Author, there is an important element that is more
about enactment than direct saying. While we can find "direct divine
pronouncements" in the Bible, indeed, these do not take up the bulk, or even a
terribly large portion of how God speaks in the Bible.67 Much of God's
communication is indirect. God sometimes shows the truth, or does the truth,
rather than stating the truth, so that his is a truth that is more to be copied and
obeyed than believed and thought. Vanhoozer refers at this point to John
Calvin's claim that "God accommodates" his communication to our human
capacity. God therefore uses not only anthropomorphism and metaphor, but also

65 A number of theologians who take the communication of God as true and possible have named a
range of different "sources, methods, and norms" for inferring truths about God. Vanhoozer does not
altogether discount these other options, but instead focuses on the biblical account as of prime importance.
See Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 188. This openness to God's speaking in other ways will, however,
become important when we come to evaluate his theology at the end.
66 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 191.
67 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 191-192.
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indirect ways of communication: "In each case, the accommodated appearance is
an adequate though not exhaustive, muted but not mutated, revelation."68
However, as has been previously stated, there are also direct
pronouncements, and more importantly, there is divine dialogue found in the
Scriptures. Are the actual recorded speech acts simply "figurative ways of
speaking about God" and if so, are they not necessarily merely anthropomorphic
projections?69 They need not be projections; God may speak as he chooses
through such divine accommodation, in order to dialogue with his people. The
idea of accommodation has been used by many theologians, particularly in the
Reformed tradition, to help clarify how God, though transcendent, can
nevertheless interact with humans in a direct and meaningful way. Ford Battle
Lewis, in an article on Calvin's understanding of God's accommodation, writes
that Calvin "was no innovator; before him went a cloud of patristic witnesses
who, in response to the destructive critique of the Scriptures by pagan and
heretic alike, had contended that God in revelation was adjusting the portrait of
himself to the capacity of the human mind and heart."70 For Calvin, says Battles,
accommodation goes beyond explaining how God speaks with us, and includes
how God deals with us in and through the whole of creation.
Thus, to sum up, while direct discourse would on such terms not be the
main way that God always communicates with us, it does not cease to be a
primary mode of communication for Christian theology. For Vanhoozer, the
Bible is not a figurative representation of God, a way by which humans speak of
a non-speaking God, but is God himself, "using language to make Himself

68 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 192.
69 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 193.
70 Ford Lewis Battles, "God was accommodating himself to human capacity," Interpretation 31, no. 1
(January 1,1977): 20, ATLA Religion Database with ATLASerials, EBSGOhost (accessed March 31, 2011).
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know n.... God literally speaks."71 At the same time, as we shall shortly see,
Vanhoozer finds the very fact that God is speaking to be important and,
moreover, central to understanding who God is, in a theo-ontology. When God,
for instance at the burning bush, reveals His name, he is seen to be a God who
communicates.72 Grasping this fact in a theo-ontology must therefore be one of
the primary tasks of the theologian.
Jesus Christ the Son of God as Trinitarian Communicative-Act
The biblical episodes of direct and indirect communication that Vanhoozer
refers to up to this point are all important, of course, but they pale in significance
in comparison with God's most powerful and effective communication: Jesus
Christ. In the human form of Jesus Christ, we have God's "literal (though
accommodated) speech, a communication that indirectly - because through a
human form - communicates God's being." The incarnation is the work of a God
who is speaking with us, who speaks directly to us in Jesus Christ. God speaks in
such a way because humans are not able to comprehend a God who is not
accommodated in such a fashion. The being of Jesus Christ is the perfect
representation of God's being, and thus we can trust it to be true in quality while
being limited by its human form. Jesus gives us a concrete example in a concrete
life, and through this lens it is uniquely possible to understand the rest of the
speaking of God. Because Jesus is the primary word of God, the primary divine
self-projection by which all other acts are understood, God's being specifically
comes into view when we begin to attend to Jesus Christ.
To say things of God's being by way of the Scriptures and Jesus Christ is,
however, not to say that either of these completely capture, or represent the being

71 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 193.
72 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 194.
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of God, for they are alike accommodated communication. But since Jesus Christ is
God's great public speech-act, Vanhoozer argues that we can use him to "ground
and give the terms we apply to God their definitive sense."73 If we are going to
say things about God's being, then, it should not be through "being-in-general
but being-through-Christ."74 This "being through Christ" has canonical
parameters. What we say of Christ is determined by what the Bible says about
him. But we do not have to go as far as Barth, says Vanhoozer, and hold that all
God's speech acts be associated with his revelation in Jesus Christ. We might
wonder why, for Barth, all divine speech-acts must be associated with Jesus,
since in the Bible there are other examples of God "in-act" that are just as valid
(for instance, in creation), which, while not definitive as the Incarnation, cannot
be ignored.75
At the same time, Vanhoozer holds that Barth is right in "making the
history of Jesus Christ, not human existence" the way we come to know
something of the God who does things with words.76 What God does with words
is to speak the Word who is Jesus Christ, thus personalizing the speech-act of
God in the incarnation. In doing so, however, it must be remembered that this
does not deverbalize the Word. Vanhoozer cites Barth with approval, noting that
in Barth, God's Word in Jesus Christ is an actual speaking, such that "Revelation
... is God's "speech act" (Rede Tat): God himself actively speaking."77 Vanhoozer,
however, while closely associating himself with Barth, must part ways with him
when he feels that Barth "demythologizes the biblical accounts of God's speaking

73 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology,
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by refusing to take them literally," and offers instead an "account of God's being
that draws on the broader biblical account of God's speak-acting."78
Vanhoozer holds, as does Barth, that God is the Author of his own selfpresenting, and that God presents himself both through spoken and written
words. God engages in a number of different communicative acts in the Bible,
furthermore, and all of them in their multiplicity say something of the "Author,"
or of his being. But God is much more than an Author as understood in human
terms, and it is not only information that he communicates, or shares with us.
God's speech-acts are special: they "create worlds, convey truth, console the poor
and suffering, reconcile sinners and judge justly."79 The concern of Barth is that if
we equate the Scriptures too closely with God, they will themselves be
misunderstood as divine, that is, as equal to God. Barth thus keeps the emphasis
on Jesus so that there is no chance of mixing up where the divine is located.
Vanhoozer, by contrast, holds to what is arguably a more exalted view of the
Bible as divine speech, but believes that we can avoid equating the Scriptures
with the divine by recognizing simply that the "speaking subject is in, but not
exhausted by the speech act."80 God is there in the words of the Scripture,
therefore, in the sense that he is the agent who produced them and who
continues to communicate himself through them. However, in Vanhoozer's
understanding, God is not as fully revealed in the Scriptures as he is in Jesus
Christ.
So the claim that Vanhoozer is making is that God does speak in many
ways through the Scriptures, and most excellently through Jesus Christ.
Vanhoozer adds that this speaking of God is not figurative but literal. If God is
78 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 205.
79 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 207.
80 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 208.
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not speaking, furthermore, then "we are unable to say either who is acting or what
this person is up to .. .."81 Can we say, for instance, that God forgives if he does
not communicate his intent to forgive with the words, "I forgive you?" The
gravity of God as literally speaking becomes clear when we realize that the
"integrity of the gospel message" hangs on whether there is or is not a God who
can speak.82 This literal speaking of God is not something that Vanhoozer
believes has to be verbal or audible. God does not require any physicality to
speak, although speak he does, whether it be through sound production or
commissioned messengers. However God speaks, it is clear, especially in the Old
Testament, that his speaking is at times "heard" by the prophets, in stark contrast
to "the silence of the idols" and of the "false gods" that do not speak.83 If God can
and does accommodate himself to the limitations of human language, and to our
life in the human form of Jesus Christ, then it would seem to follow that he can
also accommodate himself to humans so as to be heard, perhaps even audibly or
in any other way that takes into account our human limitations - such as through
a written text.
We have seen that there are affinities between Vanhoozer's position and
that of Barth, but there are also differences. Indeed, the purpose Vanhoozer has
in view in explaining the possibility of divine speech-acts in the biblical text,
apart from Jesus Christ, is to provide a corrective to the Barthian idea that the
Bible is not the actual speaking of God to his people. For Barth, says Vanhoozer,
God does not "author" the text; Barth maintains, furthermore, that to claim that
the Biblical words are the actual words of God is to do an injustice to the one true

81 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 209.
82 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 210.
83 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 213.
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living Word, Jesus Christ.84 To develop his position over against Barth's,
Vanhoozer turns to the Old Testament, where God is shown to be speaking to his
people, choosing them, promising to them, covenanting with them. Vanhoozer
says that these speech-acts of God in the Old Testament provide the canvas on
which the portrait of Jesus Christ will come into meaningful relief for those who
turn to him as Lord. Without all the previous speech-acts of God that show us
God in speech and act, Jesus' life seems merely a random occurrence, and not
part of God's plan. The Old Testament, in short, prepares the way for the life of
Jesus to make sense as the one who was promised and as the one who will save.
Thus to interpret the Bible correctly, Vanhoozer claims that we need a
clear understanding of God's speaking throughout the biblical canon rather than
just in Jesus Christ. To claim that God is speaking throughout the whole of the
Bible, he argues, "amounts to this: God's being is in his free, wise, and loving
communicate agency," in whichever speech acts he employs - although more
fully in some than others.85 Vanhoozer, however, joins with Barth in saying that
whatever we truly know of God is not disseminated through the abstract concept
of perfection, as classical theological metaphysics would put it, but through
attending to God's communicative activity.86 Equally, he agrees with Barth that
since God's communicative activity is seen fully in Jesus Christ, the paradigmatic
communicative agent, what we find is also that an account of the trinitarian
framework within which he is located is indispensable. In short, the account of
Jesus as expressed in the Gospels cannot be adequately understood without
reference to the doctrine of the Trinity.

84 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 215.
85 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 216.
86 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 219.
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God's being in Christian theology is not properly understood by recourse
to an abstract account which is developed independently of the Bible, for
knowledge of it requires us to take account of the relational, dialogical speech-act
of God incarnate. It therefore requires an account not only of the Son, but of the
Father and Spirit as well. The move made from God's acts to God's being in
Vanhoozer's theology allows him to say that God's being is distinct in its own
way, "communicating its goodness first of all ad intra."S7 God's being,
furthermore, is expressed in dynamic rather than static ways, or in relational
rather than in individuated terms. When we look to the biblical depiction of God
in communicative act, we find that God, before there was a world, and before
there were human persons with whom to communicate, was already
communicating - for the Word was before all times "in the beginning" with God
(John 1:1-2). Thus we must recognize, not only the communicative agency of God
in time, but the communicative agency of the three divine persons, in the life of
the immanent Trinity itself. For Vanhoozer, what we can say of the immanent
Trinity is the direct result of there being continuity (not identity) between the
economic and immanent Trinity. We could say nothing about God, however, and
so could not even speculate about God as Trinity, according to Vanhoozer,
"without an event of divine speaking," and except on the assumption that the
divine speaking stands in continuity with God's being.8788 We thus require God's
communication of who he is before we can speak of immanent trinitarian
relationship in God at all; otherwise, we are simply speculating.
God, however, communicates his inner relations through (among other
things) the Scriptures, in the sense that the immanent trinitarian relations are to

87 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 226.
88 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 208-209.
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be "discerned from the communicative patterns that comprise the economy."89
The prayers of Jesus, for instance, that we have recorded in the Scriptures are
nothing less than "the speaking of God with God," even though the accounts
themselves and our understanding of them are fragmentary.90 Vanhoozer writes
that Scripture depicts the life of the Father, Son, and Spirit as a "perfect drama: a
doing than which nothing greater can be conceived; a ceaseless activity o f communication
that yields consummate communion. "91 This trinitarian communication is perfect in
that it is "never ending, fully realized interpersonal communication." Such
insight is the product, of course, of Vanhoozer's strategy of remythologizing.92
Through it, we begin to apprehend the immanent trinitarian communicative
action that breaks into our world, for this action speaks out and describes the
persons in their trinitarian relations in such a way that we participate as
witnesses — in our case, via Scripture. God's being, the being of three persons in
one Godhead, is thus dialogical — it not only exists in dialogue, but more than
that, in a certain sense it is dialogue. "God is the Father addressing the Son, the
Son responding to the Father, and the Spirit overhearing."93 In Scripture this
inner communicative action is most clearly on display in the times when the
Father is communicating directly with the Son in the presence of the Spirit.
But what does this communicative activity entail for Vanhoozer? What
more, if anything, can be said of the communicative acts, and what do they tell us
about God? I have argued that Vanhoozer defends the Scriptures as the locus for
an accommodated understanding of God's being through God's communicative
action. We can now begin to see that, on such grounds, if we are going to say

89 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 243.
90 Oliver Davies, A Theology of Compassion (London, SCM Press, 2001), 199-200.
91 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 243.
92 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 244.
93 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 246.
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something more about the immanent Trinity, or the triune God's eternal being,
we must ground our thinking in the scriptural account of the "theodramatic"
actions of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.
Vanhoozer mentions one particular point of trinitarian doctrine that I
believe is important for his understanding of the idea of God in communicative
act, and that is the idea of perichoresis.94 Perichoresis is a Greek technical term
that has been well defined by Alister McGrath: 'An image often used to express
this idea is that of "a community of being," in which each person, while
maintaining its distinctive identity, penetrates the others and is penetrated by
them.'95The term was used of the Trinity by around the sixth century, and "it was
St John Damascene who ... made it a regular component of Trinitarian
thought."96 Vanhoozer himself makes associations between perichoresis and the
idea of communication, but he does not develop or expand on the idea much
farther, for the most part being content merely to point it out. He quotes George
Hunsinger, for instance, to the effect that God's life is "a life of free designation
and communion in the perichoresis of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit."97
Vanhoozer also states that it is "the eternal and temporal communicative face of
... perichoresis that characterizes God's internal and eternal triune being."98 At
such points, however, the trail runs cold. Starting from these general statements,
however, I wish to attempt to deepen the connection thus made. I will suggest
that perichoretic relationship is a very fruitful way of referring to God in his
trinitarian being in se, and that it is this divine perichoretic life that is projected

94 The Latin equivalent is circumincessio, and the Anglicized "circumincession" is often rendered as,
"mutual interpenetration."
95 Alister McGrath^ Christian Spirituality: A n Introduction (Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 1999), 50.
96 Leonardo Boff, Trinity and Society (New York, Orbis Books, 1988), 135.
97 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 255.
98 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 258.
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out into the world, into "the far country," in the content of the biblical
"m ythos."99
We cannot begin a study of perichoresis without first acknowledging that
even though Vanhoozer does believe that perichoresis provides a helpful
framework for describing the inner-trinitarian being of God as conversation, or of
God as existing in an eternal circulation and exchange of energies and perfections
in perfect love, he uses the concept and the adjective "perichoretic" carefully. The
reason for this cautious use of words is that Vanhoozer thinks that the concept of
perichoresis has perhaps been somewhat over-used and widely misused in recent
theology. He does not, in short, wish to confuse the issue further, and so he
explicitly makes a break with what at one point he calls "kenotic-perichoretic
relational ontotheology."100 Such perichoretic ontotheology has a number of
problems associated with it, but the key difference between it and Vanhoozer's
position, insofar as the question touches on his use of the concept of perichoresis,
is that such relations cannot and do not "exhaust what we want to say either
about God's being or about God's triune personhood."101 If one reduces God to
relations, then the threeness of the persons threatens to become superior to the
oneness of God, leading to what is in effect a kind of tritheism. A further problem
is that if we so emphasize perichoresis as to make the world and God exist in an
eternal dynamic relationality, as in certain versions of process theology, then we
threaten God's transcendence as Creator. Properly speaking, however,
perichoresis says nothing about how the world and God are in relationship, or
about ontology in general, as it is a strictly trinitarian term.102

99 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 259.
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God's being, then, is that of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and thus
comprises the divine trinitarian relations between the persons. This relationality
is unique and must be carefully conceived rather than trivialized in our theology.
As such, it can be helpful in specifying something about the Trinity. Since it
begins as a way of referring to what can be identified in the triune God's
communicative action as spoken of in the Scriptures, however, I would suggest
that it is especially useful for us to stress the idea. Vanhoozer's own theory of
communicative action appears to involve a number of connections with the idea
that might provide avenues for further exploration. For example, Vanhoozer
maintains that God is the one speaking in the Scriptures. What can we say of
God's being from this biblical conception of communicative agency as Vanhoozer
presents it? If communication is the act of God which makes known his being,
and if communicative act lies at the heart of divine being itself, what is the nature
of this communicative being that exists in such communicative act? One of the
best-known biblical examples of God in triune communicative action takes place
at Jesus' baptism. At this time, when Jesus and the Father and the Spirit are
presented together, the inner relations of the Trinity (God speaking with God) are
opened to us to see and to interpret. Vanhoozer cites in this context Oliver
Davies, who says that such episodes are "crucial moments" that "mark the nodal
points [in] the inner relations of the Trinity, worked out in time and space."103
The doctrine of the Trinity, properly conceived, represents the church's
understanding of this most intimate communication which is shared between
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The historically developed logical conclusion of the
biblical account of God in communicative act, therefore, is the doctrine of the
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Trinity.104 The doctrine of the Trinity, however, is not an easy point at which to
locate divine communicative action because of the constant struggle to preserve
the unity of the one God, while acknowledging also the importance of the
persons in communication. In an early article, Vanhoozer mentions one way in
which this trinitarian relationship could be reflected on - through what he calls
an "ontology of marriage," in which "there is a recognition of both sameness (one
flesh) and otherness (two distinct persons)."105 Such a balanced view of unity in
difference is present in the Christian view that "insists that the works of the
Trinity are a unity; every person of the Trinity is involved in every outward
action of the Godhead. Thus Father, Son, and Spirit are all involved in the work
of creation, which is not to be viewed as the work of the Father alone."106
Vanhoozer asks a difficult question in examining the speaking of God: "Do all
three persons of the Trinity speak in Scripture, does one person in particular
speak, or does the one God speak in three ways?"107 Vanhoozer's answer comes
in a somewhat idiosyncratic formulation, in which the speaking of God occurs in
what he calls a "three-plus-one approach [which] adds up to the triune
discourse," so that the speech of God is both that of the three persons and that of
the "unitary being of G od."108 The classical formulation of the same principle
would be rather different, though perhaps the point is much the same: on the one
hand, the persons of the Trinity work in concert, in the sense that (as classical
Latin theology puts it), opera ad extra trinitatis sunt indivisa; on the other, the one
work of the whole triune God must always be "appropriated" to one of the

104 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 42.
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persons, since the only way to be God, according to the tradition, is as one of the
persons (e.g., thus it is that the doctrine of creation is classically "appropriated"
not to "God in general," but to God the Father, who is identified in the major
creedal formulations precisely as "Maker of heaven and earth"). When referring
to the economic Trinity, Vanhoozer says more simply that, "Divine
communication ... is a unified action with three dimensions," thus again
signaling the difficulty that the doctrine of the Trinity poses for an interpretation
of the very "speech" of God from which it takes its rise. It is for reasons related to
such difficulties, however, that I wish to suggest that the doctrine of perichoresis
is needed, since it is helpful in orienting our thinking in connection with the
question of immanent trinitarian communication.
Perichoresis and the Metaphor of Dance
There are a number of other models of human communication that can
give us insight when attempting to describe the inter-trinitarian perichoretic
communication. Communication theorists, like theologians, have recognized the
intimate nature of communication in connection with its social dimension, even if
they divide on the model that best represents its social character.109 One
particular stream of communication theory, however, has recently responded to
the recognition of the intimate nature of communication by building a model of
human communication that moves away from the stale linear sender-receiver
approaches to a more relational model:
Whereas earlier theories of communication worked with a linear senderreceiver mode, more recent debate has centered on the extent to which the
process of communication requires feedback and mutual influence:

109 John Fiske, Introduction to Communications Studies (New York: Routledge, 1990), 1-2.
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communication isn't something we do to others; rather, it is an activity we
do with them. In this sense, communication is rather like dancing.110
The metaphor of dance, it will be recalled, is one that we have encountered
before in Vanhoozer. Communication as dance is thus an exciting insight for our
endeavor to say something of God's triune being. The concept of dance invokes
implications concerning communication and motion, revealing communication
as something dynamic, as an event or a "happening" (as a Barthian might put it).
The idea of dance also invokes Vanhoozer's treatment of the "dramatic" nature of
the communicative action of the economic Trinity. I wish to argue also that it
leads, or that is might lead eventually, to a better account of the communicative
life of the immanent Trinity.
The divine dialogue is not simply one in which each member speaks as
sender and hears as receiver; it allows more profoundly to imagine a melding of
dialogue and action, an intertwining, moving flow of communicative action.
Dance as a metaphor for communication fills out the dramatic model of the
triune God, because each of the persons in trinitarian theology is inherently
dynamic and is to be understood as standing in perichoretic relation to the other
two.111 Dance, especially where the partners are physically connected to one
another, through the joining of hands for instance, requires the motive
involvement of all participants. Otherwise, we are unable to call their actions
dancing. This is not to say that each dancer must be moving in order to be
dancing, but simply that each dancer furthers in some way the motion of dance

110 Roland B. Adler, Lawrence B. Rosenfeld, and Russell F. Proctor II, Interplay: The Process of
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in conjunction with their partner, whether it is as the one who "leads" or as the
one who "follows." Yet the dance is one thing rather than two, or many. In a
similar way, in the divine dance, as speech, action, or communication, each of the
persons is involved and all are part of the one dynamic event. It might be said in
the light of this analogy that the immanent Trinity is speech-act, where there is
no line between acting and speaking. The dance speaks and the words dance.
Vanhoozer puts the same point it in another way: "God in himself (in se; ad intra)
enjoys never-ending, fully realized interpersonal communication:
communion."112 Indeed, as he puts it in another place, "communion is
communication's true end."113 But communication is essential. Communication
between dancers is what makes the dance what it is; without communication
there is no mutuality, no flow, and ultimately no common action. So also it is also
in the life of the triune God.
Like a dance, the Trinity is one in a creative multiplicity involving the
"dynam ic relations between the three persons."114 The theo-ontological character
of God as a never-ending perichoresis, a flowing movement between the three
persons who never are more one than in their mutuality and reciprocity is wellilluminated by the metaphor of dance, whereas the bare term "interpenetration"
can become more like a two dimensional character out of Flatland than a term
that befits the living God. 115 Vanhoozer himself points to something more
dynamic than is sometimes found in the traditional definition when he writes,
"The things that constitute the identity of Father, Son and Spirit are ...
communicative relations: the eternal delight of the dialogical dance of call,

1,2 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 244.
113 Vanhoozer, "Triune Discourse 2," 61.
114 Vanhoozer, "Does the Trinity Belong in a Theology of Religions?," 67.
115 Edwin A. Abbott, Flatland: A Romance of Many Dimensions (New York: Dover Pub, 1992).
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response, and acknowledgment."116 Leonardo Boff, the famous South American
theologian, likewise defines perichoresis in a way that highlights dynamism:
perichoresis "is active and signifies the ... interweaving of one Person with the
others and in the others," so that "this process o f communing forms their very
nature."117
The being of God that is communicated to us by God is, in short, none
other than the being of God-in-communicative-act; what comes to us, in a
manner of speaking, is thus God dancing in a community that is "intensely
personal."118 It can be foreign to us, this perichoretic community of and in God, so
that we are tempted to reduce and redefine God by relying on inadequate
theories that do not stem from what is revealed, making God conform to our
assumptions, and ending in theological "reduction and distortion."119 Humanity
at its best, at its greatest moments of dialogue and unity cannot anticipate the full
glory of the fellowship of the Trinity. For Vanhoozer, merely human speculation
concerning the Trinity is therefore doomed to failure, as it "introduces ... nonbiblical complications" (a criticism he levels at Hans Urs von Balthasar's
description of the inner life of the Trinity, which draws rather too heavily for
Vanhoozer's taste on insights from secular thought).120
This communion that we find in the Trinity should, of course, be echoed in
the life, witness and worship of the church, and yet is rarely found within the
church. Christians struggle with the theme because the world emphasizes

116 Kevin Vanhoozer, "Triune Discourse 2," 58.
117 Boff, Trinity and Society, 136; emphasis added.
118 Thomas F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, One Being Three Persons (Edinburgh, T. & T.
Clark, 1996), 171.
119 Richard Burnett, Karl Barth's Theological Exegesis (Tubingen: Moher Siebeck, 2001), 49.
120 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 242-243.
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individuality, and theology too reflects and refines the theme.121 Our sinful hearts
seek what is best for us to the disadvantage of the other. Such individualism
denies in practice what is at the heart of the Trinity, which is perichoretic
communicative action. Nevertheless, perichoresis is an important idea for the
church to hold onto and for the church to rediscover. As Thomas Torrance has
written, the ancient idea of perichoresis:
reinforces the fact that the Holy Trinity may be known only as a whole for
it is as a whole that God makes himself known to us through himself and
in him self.... It enables us to appreciate more fully the truth that the Holy
Trinity is completely self-grounded in its own ultimate Reality, interpreted
only on its own ground and out of itself. This means that our knowing of
God engages in a deep circular movement from Unity to Trinity and from
Trinity to U nity....122
When we try to define and categorize the Trinity completely by employing lesser
human categories, on the other hand, we end up falling on either the side of the
oneness of God or on the side of the three persons, and therefore miss the point
of trinitarian faith, owing to the limitations of human categories. Rigid human
categories of being which keep God in a nonspeaking role - rather than keeping
silent ourselves where God has not spoken - have the effect of robbing Christian
theology and faith of its true content and richness. For God's being is made
visible to us, not when we begin with projections of ourselves as anthropological
subjects, "corrupted by sin,"123 but when we enter into dialogue with him, when
we therefore begin with God as a transcendent source that is beyond ourselves,
and where God consequently reigns as the Lord of speech regarding him. The
language that we use of God and of his being must therefore find its genesis in
discourse that is determined by what God has said and is saying. What he is
121 Gary Badcock, The House Where God Lives: Renewing the Doctrine of the Church for Today (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 192.
122 Torrence, The Christian Doctrine of God, 173.
123 Barth, Church Dogmatics, 1/1, 368.

118

saying to us in time comes out of and is the flowering of the eternal discourse
that exists in the perichoresis of his triune being. For us to know this God is
therefore to partake of the self-communication of God's own being, offered in his
Word.
In this chapter, I have shown how Kevin Vanhoozer places the Scriptures
at the heart of any talk about the immanent Trinity, while also recognizing the
need for philosophical and theological elaboration of its content. In the account
offered, the God who is the Author not only of creaturely being, but of his own
being through a ceaseless, eternal communication and communion, exists in a
dynamic triune relationship. This being of God cannot be rightly known through
human thought or human speculation alone, but requires the communicative-act
of God to us through the Scriptures. In the Conclusion that follows, I will offer
some more general comments on Vanhoozer's theological achievement to date,
and make a number of critical suggestions concerning where he might need to go
next. Most importantly, because Vanhoozer pays such great attention to the
speaking of God through the biblical text, I am lead to wonder if there might be
instances of God speaking which he overlooks. I will explore these other
methods which God may use to speak to us, and do so without undoing the
authority of the Bible for the Christian life.
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Conclusion - God in Communicative Action

Kevin Vanhoozer has clearly unpacked the relevance of the
communicative act and its importance, not only for a rehabilitation of meaning in
texts, but also for the recognition of the theo-dramatic nature of Scripture, and for
a metaphysics of the divine developed on the basis of the self-presentation of
God. The implication of Vanhoozer's position is ultimately that we are able to
say something about the being of God because God is speaking to us. As we
draw the thesis to a close, it would be appropriate to attempt to sum up briefly
and say something about the significance of Vanhoozer's overall theological
project insofar as we have had scope to explore it.
Meaning and God in Triune Communicative Act
The first major task that Vanhoozer set out for himself was to show that
the biblical text is able to mediate the voice of God, and indeed, that the biblical
text can mean something rather than nothing. What Vanhoozer attempts to
rehabilitate in his theology is the crucial idea that authors, and particularly God
as Author, can communicate to us through texts. This is not to say that there is a
perfect correlation between what God as Author of the biblical text has said and
what we understand. Rather, Vanhoozer has been at pains to show that a text
communicates enough of the meaning intended by the author that it can be relied
upon as a source of authorial meaning.
Those who challenge the ability of texts to convey meaning Vanhoozer
calls "undoers" (or "non-realists"), and those who believe that texts can convey
an author's meaning, he calls, simply, "believers" (or alternatively, "realists").1

1 Vanhoozer, Is There A Meaning in This Text, 450.
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One important undoer whom Vanhoozer challenges in his rehabilitation of
meaning is Jacques Derrida. Derrida is, of course, one of the prime voices active
in critiquing textual realism through the application of his method of
deconstruction. Meaning for Derrida is "a never-ending, differential play of
signifiers," while those signs which are relied upon by realists Derrida holds
"acquire w h at sen se th ey h a v e fro m their contrast with o th er signs. The resu lt is
that m ean in g is horizon, never vertical; im m an en t to language, not
transcendent."2 Therefore meaning is never a stable thing; it is always deferring,
fluctuating, and mercurial. Deconstruction has influenced a number of
theologians who have seen a whole new way of examining the biblical text
through its lens, such as can be seen in varieties of contemporary negative,
a/theology, feminist and deconstructive theologies.
It is Derrida, among others, who first points out that the claim that realists
make for text as imbued with meaning is theological. Vanhoozer says that this
recognition of the theological nature of textual meaning is perfectly situated not
for philosophical hermeneutics, which relies on reason, but for theological
hermeneutics. This insight, that there is a theological basis to a stable realm of
'authorial meaning,' drawn from Derrida (and Barthes), means that Vanhoozer
will not criticize Derrida too harshly but will use Derrida's criticism to undo a
number of errors made through the Enlightenment, specifically as these came to
fruition in certain of the 19th century Idealists. Derrida, then, in Vanhoozer's
view, has actually aided theology by showing the theological basis of all claims to
textual realism and authorial intention. Derrida has paved the way for theology
once again to assert its unique insights into the meaning of texts while at the
same time giving a sharp "bite....w hen directed at the prideful interpreter."

2 Vanhoozer, Is There A Meaning in This Text, 62.
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Vanhoozer rightly concludes that, "After Derrida, every honest interpreter will
have to acknowledge that his or her interpretation always falls short." This does
not mean that interpretation is impossible, but rather that, with hermeneutic
humility (an important hermeneutical virtue for Vanhoozer, as was mentioned in
the Introduction), we "confront a mediated immediacy.. .[and] meet with a face
or a voice...of an author," so that, through the text, we confront meaning.3
The theory that Vanhoozer builds is based partially on the work of
philosophers and literary theorists who have attempted to rehabilitate the author
by presenting a number of useful theories. E.D. Hirsch's theory grounds itself in
the "objectivity and stability of the author's intention."4 But the criticisms of
H irsh's theory are substantial enough that the theory of 'authorial intention' as
Hirsch presents it is not enough to put faith back in the communication of an
authors meaning in a text. Vanhoozer then draws on the powerful work of John
Searle that shows that meaningful communication is found not at the level of the
sign, or word, but at the level of the sentence. Meaningful communication at the
level of the sentence resists any attempt to reduce it to mere semantics. The
meaning of a word, indeterminate on its own, is made determinate by its use in a
sentence. The related concept of language as use is a product of the work of
Ludwig Wittgenstein and other 'ordinary language' philosophers. These
philosophers have shown that we understand the use of words through knowing
the socially agreed upon rules in force at the time of communication and the
context of the utterance. Ricoeur and Habermas round out Vanhoozer's
investigation that results in his idea - a Vanhoozerian equation of meaning - that
meaning is the result of someone saying something about something to someone.
This theory of meaning does not hold that the task of the interpreter is to attempt
3 Vanhoozer, Is There A Meaning in This Text, 458-459.
4 Vanhoozer, Is There A Meaning in This Text, 74.
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to return to the mind of the author, or to get in any way behind the text to the
author, but to simply understand what the author has said.
What is important to recognize is that both sides of the Vanhoozerian
equation begin and end with 'som eone/ so that we begin and end with persons.
This reminds us that it is not simply information that is passed along in text, but
rather, that a relationship is enacted. What language at the level of the sentence
does is allow for relationship, and in the case of the Bible specifically, it allows for
covenantal relationship. This covenant is one in which both the author and
reader trust that meaning is possible to be shared. The author engages the reader
by putting forward a way of viewing the world and the reader is challenged to
reject or accept it. To do this they have to engage in interpretation and their
interpretation is limited to what has been said by the author.
The unique insight that Vanhoozer offers beyond this relates to the
trinitarian nature of meaningful language. Vanhoozer says that God is the
underlying principle of all language, so that he is the "necessary condition for the
possibility of...the experience of meaningful communication."5 The Trinity is
preeminently the one who communicates as "speaker (Father), Word (Son), and
reception (Spirit)."6 The point of this is that theologians do not have to exert
themselves to justify their theology by standards developed by science or
philosophy, but can instead build theories of meaning that begin with a
"Christian understanding of God, language, and transcendence."7 Vanhoozer
thus displays, in beginning with a trinitarian theology, the very "Christian self-

5 Vanhoozer, Is There A Meaning in This Text, 456.
6 Vanhoozer, Is There A Meaning in This Text, 456.
7 Vanhoozer, Is There A Meaning in This Text, 199.
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confidence" that Alvin Plantinga once said was required of philosophy, and has
applied it to textual meaning.8
There is one particular connection that perhaps falls outside the scope of
this thesis, but that can be briefly mentioned, and that is the similarity between
Vanhoozer's view of the transmission of meaning through a text on the one side,
and the critical realist position on the other. There are three theologians in
particular who are mentioned in the critical realism entry in the Dictionary o f
Theological Interpretation o f the Bible, Bernard Lonergan, Ben Meyer and N.T.
Wright. While any of these theologians would be interesting to connect with
Vanhoozer for different reasons, suspect that there might be great insight
generated by connecting Vanhoozer's theory of meaning with Bernard
Lonergan's critical realism. The benefit of Lonergan's theory is that it offers such
a nuanced account, a "blend of cognitional theory, epistemology and
metaphysics,"9 so that it has the potential to deepen Vanhoozer's approach
significantly. Lonergan's critical realism might, in particular, add to Vanhoozer's
account of meaning a cognitive dimension that could explain why and how it is
that a covenantal discourse between God and humanity is required to break the
barrier between finite human knowledge and an infinite God.
While both Vanhoozer and Lonergan explore the question how knowledge
of God is possible, and while both begin with God, they approach the problem
from different directions. Vanhoozer believes that the prior communicative act
of God in dialogue with us is what makes knowing God possible. Lonergan, on
the other hand, sees the knowledge of God as something precipitated by the prior
experience of God's love in us, or in other words, as something ultimately

8 Vanhoozer, Is There A Meaning in This Text, 199.
9 Thorsten Moritz, "Critical Realism", Dictionary for the Theological Interpretation of the Bible, 149.
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accomplished through conversion. For Lonergan, God's love could be said to
open us to the truth that the biblical text is an actual communication of God to us,
and therefore a site by which we come to know him truly. The potential
connections are nicely summarized by the idea of revelation, and specifically the
Word of God, which is emphasized differently by each theologian. The role of
the biblical revelation for Vanhoozer is “to provide and safeguard biblical
discourse" or divine discourse, while for Lonergan it is "to empower the
interpreter spiritually and transformativly."10 But this is undoubtedly work best
left for another day.
Propositionalism and the Communicative Act
The proposition, for the realist, is the point at which meaning is located, a
meaning that can be confidently extracted from the text without loss. For the
critical realist, by contrast, it is not quite so clear that the meaning or the bulk of
authorial intention can be found by simple reference to the bare proposition. The
problem with propositionalism is that it can be clearly shown that there are a
great number of things, such as promising, forgiving, cursing etc., occurring in a
text that cannot be adequately explained or appropriated under the rubric of the
proposition. We can discover these other qualities of the text by paying attention
to the literary conventions in play in the text.
Propositionalists mine the Bible, in effect, to find data that can tell
humanity things about God. The position is in this sense very straightforward:
propositions are sentences to which a true-false schema can be applied in order to
classify what a sentence does and does not assert. This approach to the biblical
text has been rightly challenged in postmodern times, such that any responsible
theologian today must come up with a new theory altogether, or else examine the
10 Moritz, "Critical Realism", 150.
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text in a new way and take propositionalism deeper. It might be said that
Vanhoozer can be read in both ways, in the sense that he both points us back to
the text, while also pointing us to a way of deepening our view of the text, by
recognizing the text as divine authorial discourse, as God in communicative act.
This means that what Christians say of God is not something merely based on
human creativity in language, or even traditional ecclesial practice, but on the
prior speech of God in the biblical text. To look at the text as the speech of God is
to recognize its vitality, its dramatic nature, its character as a place of speech,
action, and plot. Where a strict propositionalism dedramatizes the text by
looking for 'facts' or 'truths' rather than engaging the speaker, Vanhoozer's
canonical-linguistic approach highlights the dramatic qualities present in the text,
where God is communicating in diverse forms and does so as a way to engage
humanity in relationship. What is lost when we read the Scriptures as a set of
propositions is the force "which attends to the Scripture's meaning."11 It is
nothing less than the force of God's calling that impels us to change, to covert, to
reaffirm our faith, to live holy lives. Without this force driving our reading and
hearing of the text, the text remains simply something for us think on rather than
for us to be stirred by. But when the two are tied, when we engage the text as a
means of entering into relationship with God, then the drama begins to unfold,
with God as the playwright, the Scriptures as the script, and we, the people of
God, as the players.
The key in this approach to the biblical text is that it is a theo-drama which
begins with the God who initiates all action, including speech. It is not our
experiences that are properly basic, nor the faith of humanity, but the covenantal
relationship initiated by God with us. This communicative action that God

11 Vanhoozer, The Semantics of Biblical Literature, 93.
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initiates is not simply an outward expression of God's will, but an inward reality
in the being of God as well. God in his triune being speaks and acts from all
eternity, and from that inner reality, through God's own desire to widen the
perichoretic communion in which the Trinity consists, we are drawn into
covenantal relationship with God.
But the nature of the Bible as divine communication, or speech, is not selfevident. How can the Scriptures be thought of as divine speech if God did not
vocalize them (dictate) or inscribe them? God has no mouth to speak, no hands to
write, so how can he be the Author of the text? Vanhoozer does not see this as a
particular problem that we need to be concerned with, but does point to a
rational defense for taking the biblical text as the actual words of God in the work
of Nicholas Wolterstorff. I have suggested that his account of the Bible as the
speech of God cannot be accepted by the reader without a closer study of
Wolterstorff's concept of authorization and double discourse. For this reason, I
offered a reasonably detailed critical reading of Wolterstorff earlier in this thesis.
Through examining some everyday human instances of double discourse and
authorization, Wolterstorff shows how it is possible to coherently maintain that
God could be literally said to speak and write, even though humans were the
ones who either vocalized or inscribed the biblical text. One example of double
discourse cited was that of secretary and executive. Through these methods of
understanding a text's creation, Wolterstorff gives Vanhoozer a philosophical
foundation for his claim that the biblical text, as divine discourse, is God in
communicative act, and that in it, God is actually and literally speaking.
From this point of view, that the text is the actual speech of God,
Vanhoozer moves beyond the impasse of the personal and propositional view of
biblical texts to a postpropositional position. His position places the theo-drama
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front and centre, and presents the task of theologians and all Christians as one of
needing to look to recover the illocutionary force of the divine speaker. Readers
do not of themselves provide the illocutionary force, but must look to the text to
find it, and not just in any text, but in the one that has been authorized by God,
the biblical canonical text where the promises and covenants of God with
humanity are recorded. But some would argue that the canon is an ideological
control mechanism, and Vanhoozer in fact agrees and embraces this character of
canon, because it reminds us that not all practices are acceptable, that churches
and Christians have a holy standard, one not set by us, by which our actions and
our doctrines are judged. God has authorized this text, through canonization, to
be the means by which he speaks redemptively into our human world. When the
text is taken as only a set of propositions, however, the different forms of speech
that have been used by the divine Author are ignored. Speech-act theory gives
us a more rounded understanding of the diversity of speech that the Bible
contains, such as asserting, commanding, promising, and asking. In these
speech-acts, a true/false dichotomy cannot be applied successfully. The reason
speech-acts do not fit within the propositional category is that something is done
in the speech-act itself rather than some truth being simply stated. Through his
canonical-linguistic account of the communicative acts of God, then, Vanhoozer
defends the literal speech of God as the speech-acts of God, while also
developing a postpropositional account of the Scriptures. The Bible, however,
remains a preeminent locus of Gods interaction with us, his people.
I would argue that the most pressing issue in further research on the theodramatic nature of Scripture in Vanhoozer's account surrounds whether or not
the treatment of cognitive-propositionalism that he provides is correct. In short,
the question is whether or not Vanhoozer has treated fairly those who hold to the
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cognitive-propositional position. Paul Helm, for instance, has made some very
strong criticisms of Vanhoozer's work that seem to indicate that Vanhoozer's
treatment of cognitive propositionalism is flawed. Helm asks of Vanhoozer's
Drama o f Doctrine:
What of the great doctrinal works of Christian genius? Where do they
stand...? Are these great achievements to be dismissed with a wave of the
hand as 'cognitivist-propositionalist' efforts, works of detached scientia,
which, employing a picture theory of meaning, 'de-dramatize' Scripture,
and endeavor to express it in a series of timeless and universal truths?
Kevin never takes up this vital issue, nor even hints at an answer to it.12
Helm's review of Vanhoozer's Drama o f Doctrine is very critical and raises a
number of questions that need to be explored, though such exploration falls
beyond the scope of the present thesis.
God's Being in Triune Form
In my final chapter, I outlined Vanhoozer's view of the identity of God,
that is, his doctrine of the Trinity. Vanhoozer has many times stated that
anything we know of God is based on the fact that God has first spoken to us. To
have any indication of God's identity in triune form, therefore, we are going to
have to refer to what God has told us about himself or shown of himself. For
Vanhoozer, the place that he communicates, or shows himself as a God who
communicates, is utterly basic to the Scriptures. This, however, is a contentious
point because there have been a number of theologians who believe that God
does not speak in the Scriptures, not the least of whom is the leader of the
demythologization agenda, Rudolf Bultmann. For Bultmann, we can say nothing
of God, so that all human speech about God, including what is found in the
Scriptures, lose their object, God, insofar as they cannot but speak of him in
12
Paul Helm, "Analysis: Unexpected Help," Helm's Deep Blog, entry posted August 1, 2008,
www.paulhelmsdeep.blogspot.com/2008/08/analysis-17-unexpected-help.html (accessed April 27,2011).
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human language. Vanhoozer, on the other hand, maintains that the Scriptures
are the very real speech of God. The Scriptures are, furthermore, the final
authority for right speech about God, so much so that they serve as both means
to and control over what we can say about God's being. The Scriptures as God's
communication allow us to speak of God without losing God in the effort to
speak. If God had not first spoken we could not say anything about God and any
experience of God would be unspeakable because it would not have any
authoritative reference outside of the human being. It would fall before Ludwig
Feuerbach's challenge to religion as human projection. But in Vanhoozer's
theology, God finds a way to us, he communicates himself through his own self
presentation. Ultimately, Vanhoozer's defense of this position is what he calls
"remythologizing."
One way in which Vanhoozer has spoken of God in self-communication is
in connection with the idea of God as "Author." God is an Author who has
decided to speak his voice into the lives of people, communicating life to them
through the Scriptures. Vanhoozer once again turns to speech-act theory as a
way to give substance to the claim that God actually speaks, and this time over
and against those who claim that the Scriptures are a revelation of God's actions
but not the actual words of God to us. Vanhoozer distances himself from the
claim that God's speech and human speech directly correspond to one another,
but at the same time insists that an incomplete correspondence between human
and divine speech, does not mean that there is no correspondence at all.
One important literary tool used regularly in the Scriptures, and which has
been used as evidence for Feuerbach's belief that theology is human projection, is
anthropomorphic language. Anthropomorphic language is the best example
many would argue of humans projecting their qualities to God. But as
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Varthoozer shows, particularly through his reliance on Paul Ricoeur's treatment
of metaphor, of which anthropomorphism is a type, such use of language is not a
way of making direct correspondence between two things. Through a very
limited correspondence, metaphorical language finds its truth in the literary
equation of "is" and "is not." A metaphor is meaningful, and is powerful,
precisely insofar as we recognize how a thing is like another thing and also how
it is different. If we miss where this divide is located, we will make ridiculous
claims that the author of the text never intended to convey.
God uses different ways of speaking to us through the Scriptures. He uses
indirect communication, which is a case of showing rather than telling, and a
type of accommodated speech that functions within human limitation, so that we
can understand the revelation. Such indirect speech in fact takes up the bulk of
what we read in the Bible, but it is not the only method that God uses to
communicate through the text. God also communicates through direct speech.
This direct speech is also inevitably accommodated speech, however, since it is
speech that comes from a great and holy God to a sinful and limited humanity.
God chooses to limit his communication to our capacity for understanding and
thus speaks using human linguistic methods. Nevertheless, on Vanhoozer's
terms, God is not figuratively speaking with us, but literally speaking.
The most powerful and singular speech-act of God, for Vanhoozer, is his
Word, Jesus Christ. Christ through the incarnation communicates God's being to
us. Because Jesus is God, though in accommodated human form, we can trust
him to be a true representation of God's being, and we thus can say something of
God's being through paying attention to Jesus. Jesus Christ, while not the only
speech-act of God, is the definitive one and is the standard by which all other
speech-acts of God in the Scriptures are to be measured and understood. For
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Vanhoozer, however, God also literally speaks in the Scriptures. Yet this does
not mean that the Scriptures are a fourth hypostasis. For while God as the subject
of the speech act, is truly in the speech-act, he is not fully in the speech act. Thus,
while God is only partially revealed by speech, the Scriptures can be the real
speech of God but not identical with his being.
God, for Vanhoozer, is speaking in the Scriptures, and God's being is
revealed through the self-presentation of God in speech. Among the most
important instances of this are those in which God is speaking within himself,
those fragmentary 'conversations' of God speaking with God that we find in the
Bible. These conversations show us that God's being is, at its core, trinitarian
communication, never ending and fully realized. The idea of perichoresis is a
wonderful way of understanding the communication within the immanent
Trinity.
Communication theory has moved beyond a sender-receiver model of
communication and developed new insights that actually hearken back to this
ancient doctrine of the perichoretic, which envisions communicative acts
employing feedback and mutual influence - that is, which sees communication as
relational. Dance is a successful metaphor for the communication of God within
his triune self that points to the unity of the one and the multiple, which in God
exist in fluid, never-ceasing, creative, communicative being. This communicative
act which exists from all eternity at the level of God's being gives us a good ideal,
furthermore, for how communication should characterize also the life of the
church.
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Closing Considerations: A Spirituality of God in Communicative Act
Kevin J. Vanhoozer has given theologians much to wrestle with and think
through in his several lengthy works. Since the writing of Is There a Meaning in
this Text?, he has attempted to engage the detractors of theology honestly, neither
letting them set the agenda nor unfairly or naively criticizing them so as to move
too quickly to what others might consider more important theological matters.
He makes his criticisms with a very strong sense of his own Christian beliefs.
With Christian self-confidence he takes into account the value of critics such as
Derrida and Feuerbach, and then moves beyond them without losing a chastened
sense of our human limitations and gaze.
In the three works I have examined, Vanhoozer has both defended and
added to Christian theological understanding of what it might mean to say that
the Scriptures are an instance of God, and specifically the triune God, in
communicative action. The words of the Bible are actually the words of God to
us, the locus of the Spirit's effectual call to faith, and our authoritative rule of life.
While I agree with him that "Scripture is a living and active divine word that
God uses to do many things," however, I believe that it is also necessary to say
that God is in communication with us outside of the text too, in powerful and
transformative ways, a position to which I would suggest that Vanhoozer has
given insufficient consideration.13 Such speaking of God outside of Scripture is a
communication that occurs in individual and collective human experiences of
God, and while they may not be the sole or primary mode of knowing God, these
experiences, or feelings, are at least co-present with the biblical text in coming to
and developing such knowledge. Indeed, they are prominently spoken about in
the biblical text itself - in dreams, for instance, or in the many instances of

13 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 132.
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"nature theophany" to be identified in the Psalms, or more overtly, in the varied
"m ystical" experiences to which the Bible bears witness - and therefore
presumably warrants.
One modern theologian closely associated with the importance of
experience in the development of our knowledge of God is Friedrich
Schleiermacher. Vanhoozer does not completely disregard Schleiermacher's
claims concerning the importance of the religious affections, but he would
certainly disagree that they are adequate means for knowledge of God in
themselves. Vanhoozer observes that, "A ll knowledge may begin in
experience.. .but if it ends there too, then we shall have no means to arbitrate
conflicting views as to what God is like."14 A theologian standing in the tradition
of Schleiermacher might respond by turning the tables in some such fashion as
this: 'If we end there, in the Scriptures, then we have no means to understand the
speaking of God - such as in a call to conversion - in individual lives today, and
we will also miss out on what God is like by virtue of out losing hold of such
things. God's speaking is a means of transformation; it is a personal call, an
instance of divine speaking in the particular and personal lives such that we learn
things about God through our own interaction with Him.' I would myself wish to
make such a claim.
In fairness, perhaps, Vanhoozer does point to the fact that God speaks in
other ways than in the Scriptures. He writes:
Those who believe intelligible speech of God is possible often differ with
regard to sources, methods, and norms. ... [S]ome seek to infer truths
about God from created reality. Others believe that we may infer certain
things about God on the basis of individual or ecclesial experience and
practice. Still others believe that the incarnation of Jesus Christ serves as
14 Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, 6.
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the singular basis for proper God-talk. The path ahead does not rule out
these other approaches but focuses primarily on the biblical texts in their
dual capacity as records and instances of God's self-communication.15
But what about these other approaches, which are mostly neglected in
Vanhoozer's theology? He says that, 'Participation in God is ultimately a matter
of "fitting" into forms of triune communicative action.'16 What does this
participation look like, however, and what does such a "fitting" entail?
I would suggest that such questions open up intriguing possibilities for a
spirituality deriving from the idea of God in communicative act, a "fitting" of
Scripture and experience into the whole of transformative Christian living. In a
spirituality fitting the theology of God in communicative act, God could be
understood as speaking in new and exciting ways into human lives today.
Divine speaking in the present would here be one of the keys to knowing God,
and while any such speaking would have to be, in keeping with Vanhoozer,
consistent with what God has said in Scripture, it would need to go farther than
Vanhoozer, by not being limited to those particular words that Scripture
comprises.
Nicholas Wolterstorff, it so happens, himself attempts a more rounded
account of God's communication in Divine Discourse, by situating the speaking of
God to people in the church historically (Augustine), in Scripture (Hosea and the
Apostles), and in the present day (to his friend Virginia). In this broad account of
God speaking, God is recognized not only as speaking in the Scriptures or as
animating such scriptural speech today (e.g., in a sermon), but as speaking into
personal lives and situations in new ways that again reveal things about God's
self. While Vanhoozer, admittedly, gives us some indications that he recognizes
15 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 188.
16 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 272.
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that divine discourse in the present is possible, he situates his overall theological
exploration of the communication of God so massively within the framework of
the Scriptures and in connection with the life of Jesus Christ, that he can be justly
accused of neglecting God's other speech acts.
I would argue that Vanhoozer needs to develop a somewhat broader
account of these things in order to achieve a comprehensive view of the identity
of God in communicative action. Vanhoozer points to the possibility, but does
not develop it, even though it is present within his work. For instance, he
mentions how, in his work as a theologian, a "persistent voice has for some years
now impressed upon me the formal and material importance for Christian
theology of triune communicative action: God's voice, God's word, God's
breath."17 God here seems to be communicating with Vanhoozer on personal
matters (his work as a theologian), matters relevant to Vanhoozer's life, in ways
that are happily informed by, but not directly attached to, the Scriptures.
Such possibilities lie on the horizon of Vanhoozer's theology and, I
believe, are already a part of the way he works as a theologian. In fact,
Vanhoozer himself recognizes a movement towards the mystical in his work. In
the Conclusion of Remythologizing Theology, he speaks of how he finds it
necessary to "push in the other direction in an attempt to stop the slide into the
mystical" to which his work is leading.18 While I can see that he wants to ride the
narrow way between extremes, between myth and the mystical, the trouble is
largely that he has not undertaken a sufficiently detailed account of the mystical
before rejecting it. It is as if he has arrived at the edge of deep waters, and
instead of jumping in, dips his toe, finds it an uncomfortable milieu, and beats his

17 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, xviii.
18 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 471.
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retreat. It fact, he equates mysticism with what he finds in only one author,
Rudolf Otto, which is hard to credit in view of his drawing upon so many
sources in other areas of concern.
As Vanhoozer has expanded on Barth's account of Jesus Christ as the only
speech act, and in view of Vanhoozer's desire to "draw on the broader biblical
account of God's speak-acting"19 so I would suggest that we must go farther than
the biblical account of God's speaking presented by Vanhoozer. Theologians and
Christians alike must indeed use "God's greatest public speech act...to ground
and give the terms we apply to God their definitive sense"20 - but in the context
of a present, active divine speech-act in the hearts of believers.
A useful foil to Vanhoozer might be Mark McIntosh, an important
theologian who offers depth in his description of the speaking of God to both
saints and common men and women, and who employs the notion of a
trinitarian communicative act in order to attempt to understand this divine
communicative activity. Like Vanhoozer, McIntosh locates the initial power,
intention, and content of what Christians know rightly about God in God's self.21
God is the "acting agent" who is leading the church into an ever deepening
knowledge of himself, and thus transforming it.22 This transformation, which can
equally be spoken of as a conversion, comes about through humans who interact
with God as "characters] with an author." McIntosh makes the claim that, 'The
more attuned to the author's speaking you become, the more alive, the more
"yourself" you come to feel as the purpose and truth of yourself grows more

19 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 205
20 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 197.
21 Mark A. McIntosh, Divine Teaching: An Introduction to Christian Theology (Malden, MA.: Blackwell
Pub., 2008), 11.
22 McIntosh, Divine Teaching, 13.
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luminous within you /23 Knowledge of God's voice here comes not in a direct
hearing of the biblical text, but neither does it come without direct and special
reference to the biblical text. The transformed mind thinks God's Word as God's
speech because it can "think by means of [it]: with a theological mind that has
died and is now alive in Christ, drawing its mode of reflection from Christ."24 In
recognizing the Author's voice as actively speaking into our lives today in varied
ways and through various mediums, people can "share in the mystical life, the
life in which the hidden presence of God - as the voice speaking all things into
existence - can be sensed and acknowledged in all things...."25 The mystical life,
for McIntosh, is not to be avoided but embraced as a way of being theological,
and as a way of opening us up to the "divine speaking in everything."26
I do agree with Vanhoozer that if the "mystical" meant that we can know
nothing of God, then we are right to avoid it. McIntosh, however, makes a more
positive case. What mysticism recognizes is not a complete mystery (as we find in
Otto) but a partial mystery. Thus we are able, over time, to experience a
"continual conversion to the ever greater mystery of God."27 God is not
completely inaccessible or complete mystery, but at the same time there are
unreachable depths to God,28 which can "set our soul on fire with longing for full
possession of eternal light.. .a full vision of God."29 This fire that touches our
souls is self-involving, experiential and creates a yearning to know God more
completely. Such knowledge is not humanly determined but is determined by
God. God decides what experiences, and which words that disambiguate these
23 McIntosh, Divine Teaching, 22.
24 McIntosh, Divine Teaching, 22.
25 McIntosh, Divine Teaching, 24.
26 McIntosh, Divine Teaching, 26.
27 McIntosh, Divine Teaching, 27.
28 McIntosh, Divine Teaching, 39.
29 William of St. Thierry, Golden Epistle: A Letter to the Brethren at Mont Dieu, trans. Theodore
Berkeley (Kalamazoo, Michigan: Cistercian Pub., 1980), 97.
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experiences, will count as originating from God. This is so, says McIntosh,
because the "unfolding within us of God's own self-understanding can only have
any real basis in us insofar as it is an unfolding within us of God's own self
understanding."30 And what is God's self-understanding but what we encounter
in the speaking of God heard in the biblical text?
As Rowan Williams has noted, "Language about God is kept honest in the
degree to which it turns on itself in the name of God, and so surrenders itself to
God: it is in this way that it becomes possible to see how it is still God that is
being spoken o f.... Speaking of God is speaking of God and opening our speech
[and experiences] to God's."31 So the biblical text is an authority that is neither
first nor last but one that coheres with personal experience, within the dynamic
weaving of a person's life of faith. Faith includes the direct speaking of God into
a person's life, against which the previous words spoken in the past through
prophets and apostles act as a check, and then a co-instigator to further
movement towards God, who is its unfathomable source and goal.
Not the least of the mysteries with which we are confronted in this
dynamic is that of God is his triune being. The Scriptures, as Vanhoozer has
shown, tells us much about the Trinity. We are in fact offered participation in the
divine being through God's self-communication. But does this self
communication of the triune being happen in ways outside the Bible that provide
true knowledge of this same being? McIntosh thinks so. He quotes Augustine,
for instance, from Book VIII of the De Trinitate, saying that, "Augustine wants
more than anything to assist his readers into a living encounter with the truth of

30 McIntosh, Divine Teaching, 35.
31 McIntosh, Divine Teaching, 50.
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God as Trinity, and this means that...he wants to discuss the mystery of the
Trinity 'in a more inward m anner.'"32 Augustine, McIntosh says,
.. .does not intend to lead us step by step to arrive at a deeper
understanding of God as Trinity, but rather to lead us step by step to the
point when we will see, and rejoice, that our concepts for God as Trinity
are wonderful but hopelessly inadequate. And in that moment, he hopes,
we will be open to the Trinity's own far more direct and inward teaching.33
This inward teaching comes from God, and preserves the self-communication of
God that Vanhoozer has defended.
So where Vanhoozer wants to stop the slide into mysticism I believe he
must soldier on! The Scriptures are an avenue of knowing God because they are
his speech. The Scriptures are authoritative, yes, and so they set the boundaries
which determine what will and will not count as God's speech today, but they
are at the same time only part of the broader speaking of God throughout history
up to and including the present day. There is, for the believer, the possibility of a
"mystical participation in God" that allows for a deeper intimacy and knowledge
of the Trinity than the one that comes to us solely through the biblical text.34
Seen in this light, the contribution of Kevin J. Vanhoozer could be said to
be that, through dialogically engaging God's triune communicative action in the
Scriptures, people of faith can be led to ask where else God may be speaking, and
so telling us about himself and inviting us into relationship.

32 Saint Augustine, The Trinity VIII. Prologue, trans. Edmund Hill (New York: New City Press,
1991), 242.
33 McIntosh, Divine Teaching, 149.

34 McIntosh, Divine Teaching, 167.
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